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Abstract
This is an article in two parts. Part i offers a 
new way of looking at progressivism and pro-
gressive politics by defining different typolo-
gies of progressivism and by looking for these 
approaches in the cultural strategies of specif-
ic ethnic groups. The study offers a theory of 
how these progressive cultural strategies are 
maintained and distinguishes these strategies 
from apparent “progress” that may simply 
be a phenomenon of temporary accommoda-
tion of different ethnic groups in more com-
plex systems. Part ii examines the ideology 
of “progress” as part of the cultural strategy 
of Jews and whether this strategy, which ap-
pears stronger when Jews are minorities in the 
Diaspora, is consistent with Jewish culture 
once Jews have a territorial boundary where 
they are a “majority.” This article touches 
upon the political choices that Jewish “po-
litical progressives” and Jews, overall, have 
made recently in the U.S.; modifying their 
support for “progress” in return for political 
representation, with parallels to the historical 
situations of other minorities. While “identity 
based” political choice that slows the over-
Resumen
Este artículo consta de dos partes. En la pri-
mera parte se ofrece un nuevo enfoque sobre 
el progresismo y las políticas progresistas me-
diante la definición de diversas tipologías de 
progresismo y buscando estas aproximaciones 
en las estrategias culturales de grupos étnicos 
específicos. Este trabajo teoriza sobre la forma 
en que estas estrategias se mantienen y las dis-
tingue del «progreso» aparente que puede ser 
simplemente un fenómeno efímero de adapta-
ción de dichos grupos étnicos en sistemas más 
complejos. En la segunda parte se examina la 
ideología del «progreso» como componente 
en la estrategia cultural de los judíos y si esta 
estrategia, que se muestra más fuerte cuando 
los judíos son minorías en diáspora, es cohe-
rente con la cultura judía una vez los judíos 
han conseguido un límite territorial en el que 
son ya «mayoría». Este artículo alude a las op-
ciones políticas que los judíos «políticamen-
te progresistas» y los judíos, en general, han 
tomado recientemente en los Estados Unidos 
de América; modificando su apoyo al «progre-
so» a cambio de más representación política 
de forma paralela a las situaciones históricas 
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all “progress” of civilization appears to have 
protected Jewish interests in the short term, 
historical comparisons suggest that this choice 
will endanger Jews if the U.S. economy and 
U.S. global influence collapse, in a direct his-
torical parallel to the European Holocaust; of-
fering an opportunity to test theories on how 
(and whether) “progress” occurs. In short, this 
study examines the choice that Jews made 
in the 20th century to define themselves as 
“European” rather than “Middle Eastern” (or 
“Eastern”) and how a rethinking of this choice 
could be fundamental to protecting Jews in Is-
rael and to restarting a global impetus for both 
social and political “progress.”
Key Words: Progressive, left, liberalism, 
social justice, political justice, rights, Jews, 
Blacks, Israel, Holocaust, U.S. Presidential 
elections, empire, ethnic conflict, moderniza-
tion, globalization.
de otras minorías. Aunque la opción política 
«basada en la identidad» que ha ralentizado el 
«progreso» general de la civilización parece 
haber protegido los intereses judíos a corto 
plazo, las comparaciones históricas sugieren 
que esta elección puede poner en peligro a 
los judíos si la economía estadounidense y 
su influencia mundial se colapsan, de manera 
paralela a lo que ocurrió durante el Holocaus-
to europeo; ofreciendo una oportunidad para 
poner a prueba las teorías sobre cómo (y si) 
se produce un «progreso». En resumen, este 
estudio examina las elecciones tomadas por 
los judíos durante el siglo xx para definirse a 
sí mismos como «europeos» en vez de «orien-
tales de Levante» (o «del Este») y como un 
replanteamiento de esta elección podría ser 
fundamental para la protección de los judíos 
en Israel reiniciando de manera global el 
«progreso» tanto a nivel social como político.
Palabras clave: Progresismo, izquierda, libe-
ralismo, justicia social, justicia política, dere-
chos, judíos, negros, Israel, holocausto, elec-
ciones generales estadounidenses, imperio, 
conflicto étnico, modernización, globalización.
1. Introduction
In an interview on the news network Democracy Now exploring U.S. government 
response to the global financial crisis officially starting in 2008, journalist Naomi Klein 
raised but did not answer a question about something she termed the “intellectual dis-
honesty” of “progressive” “liberal left” politics in the U.S. The answer to and the re-
phrasing of, that seemingly simple question may touch on the very heart of global 
politics and identities in this century and on the human future. 
At the center of the discussion was why economist Larry Summers, whose name is 
associated with the causes of the global financial crisis, along with Robert Rubin and 
Alan Greenspan, have all escaped accountability or (as in the case of Summers) were 
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even “rehired” to preside over the “solutions.” Klein charged that the world was “pay-
ing the price of the—frankly, the intellectual dishonesty of the progressive liberal left 
during the Bush years,” 1 though not defining who constitutes this group or why they 
would have chosen dishonesty. 
Has the “progressive liberal left” been “intellectually dishonest?” Who are they? 
What dishonesty is being referred to? Is there a particular double standard that is being 
applied? And what does this question about one such group in the U.S. at one historical 
time in history tell us about the much larger question about human “progress”?
While terms like “progressive,” “liberal,” and “left” are often in the eye of the be-
holder, it is possible to more precisely define different approaches to “progress” (ideas 
and actions) and to link them to particular cultural traditions to see whether or not they 
are part of the human experience that is transmitted through time. Once the traditions 
are identified with certain ethnic groups, it is possible to measure some of the non-
conformist (“progressive”) behaviors of those identified groups over time and to look at 
the decisions that these groups are now making that do have implications for historical 
progress. These decisions can also be used as a way to examine and test some ideas 
about historical change, with unfolding events in our own time serving as a kind of 
social experiment on “progress.” 
It is possible to use available data on minorities in the U.S. – African Americans, 
Hispanics, and particularly Jews – to confirm Klein’s observation while posing ques-
tions and seeking data that take the analysis several steps farther. The historical data 
of changing voting patterns of Jews in the U.S., for instance, indicates a co-optation of 
their historic progressive role in supporting equal application of laws and standards over 
the past century (some four to five generations). While Jews in the U.S. retain cultural 
differences and avoid full assimilation, Jewish intellectuals have recently diverged from 
an historic practice of supporting ideals of rule of law in democratic systems where 
Jews are a minority 2. The oft offered explanation that this double standard represents 
the “protection of Israel” raises a larger question of how Jewish “progressives” are de-
fining their interests and their role and the political trade Jews are making. It also raises 
questions about whether a single minority culture continues to promote strategies of 
human “progress” once its own interests seem protected and when it has something to 
protect that it fears to lose.
A closer look at the data suggests that non-Jewish leaders have managed to co-opt 
Jewish progressives by playing on Jewish fears and short-term interests now in the 
post-Cold War period in much the same way as during the beginning of the Cold War. 
The significance of this choice for the U.S. and for the world, given the important role 
that Jews played in promoting “progress” between 1945 and 1980, is that it has severely 
1. Klein, 2008.
2. Jewish “Communist” and “Socialist” leaders of Parties that took power in Hungary in 1919 and 1948-56 and in the 
Soviet Union between 1918 and 1936, and leading parties in Israel, today, could also be said to have abandoned ideals 
of political and legal symmetry/ equality.
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weakened any political force or pressure for global progress towards ideals of legality, 
co-existence, symmetry and rule of law. It is possible that this change signals the “end” 
of history in our lifetimes, in the sense of regression towards short-term self-interest and 
political power rather than development of law and standards 3. 
As Jews in the U.S. agreed to redefine themselves as “American/Western European” 
and “anti-Eastern European” for security at the beginning of the Cold War, Israel’s Jews 
have also continued to consider themselves “Europeans” in the European colonial tradi-
tion, rather than seek to diversify the Jewish global identity in a way that more closely 
ingratiates Jews with their Middle Eastern, Asian, or African neighbours. The identity 
of Jews in the U.S. and throughout the world, today, is one that includes little identifica-
tion with Middle Eastern neighbors or Asians and that continues to ally with U.S. and 
European imperial and resource interests. 
Comparison of the Jewish situation in the world today with that of Jews in the col-
lapsing Austro-Hungarian and German Empires in World War i suggests that the condi-
tions prior to the Holocaust could now be re-emerging as the U.S. Empire collapses. 
This very choice that Jews have made to secure their interests could actually be what 
most endangers the Jewish future. As the U.S. Empire and Western European influence 
continue to fall and as oil resources in the Middle East are exhausted, Jews will soon 
face a new dilemma over identity as well as a potential resurgence of violence directed 
against Jews in the United States in ways that will test theories about Jewish culture and 
progress, about progress, and about ethnic accommodation and violence.
There is an emerging new opportunity for Jews in Israel and elsewhere to redefine 
themselves by reconnecting with Middle Eastern roots and attempting a new peace, 
reconciliation, and prosperity alongside Middle Eastern neighbors, the emerging pow-
ers of Asia, and the Islamic world, but Jews do not appear to be taking it 4. That choice 
and its consequences also offer a living social experiment on cultural adaptation and 
on “progress.”
3. While there has been much debate over whether globalization represents the “end of history” in terms of movement 
towards Western concepts of rationality, the weakening of any political and intellectual movements to continue develop-
ing these concepts effectively means that they will stagnate. This extends Azar Gat’s, “The End of the End of History,” 
Foreign Affairs, July 2007 and links it with the many criticisms of declining democracy in the U.S. and Western Europe.
4. As this article goes to press in December 2015, an American political leader of the progressive tradition, Vermont 
Senator Bernie Sanders, who is Jewish, has suddenly risen on the political scene calling for exactly this kind of “political 
revolution” and potential for reconciliation. This article offers a timely test for American Jews as well as emerging data 
to add to the analysis. 
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2. Part i: Measuring “Progress” in the New Millennium and its Ethnic 
Dimensions
The first part of this article begins the search for answers about human political and 
social progress by looking for ways to measure it and to link it to social science vari-
ables. It begins with a new way of looking at such progressivism and progressive poli-
tics that defines different typologies of progressivism and looks for these approaches 
in the cultural strategies of specific ethnic groups. Data on political behavior among 
different minority groups helps to generate some theories as to how progressive cultural 
strategies are maintained and how they can be distinguished from apparent “progress” 
that may simply be the temporary accommodation of different ethnic groups in more 
complex systems.
2.1. Defining “Progressive” Development of Humanity
Is civilization still progressing or are we regressing? How would we even know? 
Answering this question requires starting with an agreed definition on what constitutes 
human progress, but there does not seem to be a clear or agreed definition of what 
“progressive” politics is. The ideal itself seems to be a different battleground for ethnic 
and cultural interpretations. Nevertheless, definitions seem to fall into three categories, 
even though there is disagreement about their exact origins or motivating forces. Each 
category also offers some potential measures.
Human “progress” and “progressivism” is generally conceived in three ways that 
are not mutually exclusive. Each offers measures that can also be used to differentiate 
political platforms, ideologies, candidates, and actions over time:
2.1.1. Technological “Modernization” Progressives
Technocrats and modernists focus on industrial and technological development, with 
the measure of progress the understanding of and application of natural and scientific 
laws to achieve greater human control over the universe. This reflects the biological re-
ality of human and primate evolutions of the brain that allow for understanding of time 
and the ability to develop technologies. There is some debate over whether this is en-
tirely a linear process of development or a radial adaptive process of developing science 
and technology in environments and how that relates to the other two types of progress; 
social and political. The Western concept of science generally assumes a linear, though 
uneven progress 5. Sometimes the social and political institutions that accompany these 
5. Kuhn, 1970.
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technologies are also assumed to be those that are the most advanced and progressive 6. 
Though few civilizations have produced advanced technology without also develop-
ing philosophies that have included concepts of human progress (some form of social 
and political equality), there are also questions as to whether industrial advance can be 
achieved without some kind of competition either between ethnic groups (with the need 
for military dominance driving innovation) or between individuals.
Measures: Scientific and productivity advances.
2.1.2. Social Progressives
Social progressives focus on equitable results (equality of condition) following prin-
ciples of symmetry and concepts of “justice” or “fairness” that follow from that prin-
ciple. One of their key aims is “progressive taxation” as a way of redistributing wealth 
and offering economic opportunity and a safety net. This view of progress is a religious 
or social and economic rights concept that comes out of almost every religious tradi-
tion and embraces the ideal of charity and giving a helping hand to others. It is said to 
reflect the biological impulse of humans for social relations and cooperation, starting 
with small collectives. In larger societies, the ideal is often reflected in “interest” politics 
for meeting the needs of minorities and the poor through social justice.
Measures: Economic and social justice for the poor or for minorities that suffer 
discrimination. The key measures of political action and candidate stands are those on: 
“Progressive taxation” and redistribution for social welfare (health care and education, 
social services) and economic opportunity; military and police spending for defensive 
protection rather than for hegemony over resources or peoples; subsidies for farmers 
and rural areas.
2.1.3. “Rule of Law” and Political Progressives and Civil Libertarians
Political progressives focus on development of human systems, institutions and in-
struments, usually based on the concept of “rule of law” or “natural rights” in order to 
enforce the principles of symmetry and diversity for long-term survival interests. This 
is the political rights view of equity and justice that looks not only at outcomes and 
charitable acts but that tries to systematize the process to assure balances of interests 
and appropriate long-term results (including protections for future generations). It is the 
“meta” approach to progress that combines scientific thinking and long-term planning 
6. Much of the discipline of anthropology and its premise of cultural relativism are based on challenging the linear 
view of evolution of all systems and the teleological progression of cultures to fit linear progressions of technology. 
These critiques also extend into the development and environmental policy and sustainable development and cultural 
rights literature. For some of the earlier classic discussions of this evolution of technology and systems, see Durkheim, 
2014; Weber, 1958; Service, 1975; Toffler, 1981; Hofstader, 1955; Galbraith, 1967; Kerr, 1983; Bell, 1071: 102-168; 
Degler, 1992; Wallerstein, 1979. 
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with concepts of social justice and continued scientific development. The biological root 
of the idea of political progress is the evolution of the human ability both to plan for 
future events and to demonstrate empathy. It is a counterweight to the idea of “might 
makes right” and that individual nations or individuals are “exceptional” or “above the 
law.” In complex societies, this idea of progress goes beyond the idea of efficiency and 
modern bureaucracy to incorporate an ideal of accountability, participation, fairness 
(equal opportunity) and rights (both individual rights and community/cultural rights) 
at different levels in ways that are enforceable. This systematization also assumes the 
use of scientific thinking to establish standards and measurements of the quality of 
processes.
Measures: Political participation and oversight to achieve equality (e.g., political 
system reform for equal access and oversight; corporate regulation; governmental regu-
lations; electoral reforms; legal system participation and reforms; press and agenda 
setting equality of access): Judicial equity and equal enforcement (including use of 
mechanisms against high officials in government and corporate/private sector); Interna-
tional law and treaty obligations; Civil liberties (reduction of death penalty and torture; 
protection of privacy; due process and protection against collective punishment or dis-
crimination; gender rights; protection of future generation interests and environment; 
etc.); Rule of law for protection of the full set of political rights (consumer rights, labor 
rights; Indigenous rights ad federalism); Adherence of individual nations to interna-
tional legal bodies rather than avoidance through ideologies of “exceptionalism” or 
special rules. Another way to measure progress in this area is the advance of social sci-
ence since inquiry into human systems and the creation and testing of those systems in 
a scientific way (combining the ideals of technical progress and of social justice) reflect 
the higher order development of planning systems. One set of measures that the author 
has generated from these concepts that reflects the post-World War ii international con-
sensus found in international is a set of “Universal Development Goals” 7.
Before trying to link these concepts to specific ethnic groups, it is interesting to take 
a quick look at the three categories to consider where they might be historically rooted. 
Any “civilization” by definition supports the concept of technological progress. Today, 
the ideology of “development” or the “right to development” as promoted by interna-
tional powers is generally defined by these interests as the promotion of technological 
advance using the science and technologies of these powerful interests.
The idea of “social justice” is rooted in most major religions and is not specific to 
any group. In complex systems, it is often the rallying point for any categorically dis-
advantaged minority. Much of the global movement today for equality between “North 
and South” or for promotion of the Millennium Development Goals (now the Sustain-
able Development Goals) through the United Nations, is one where social progressives 
can come from multiple groups. Though there are differences in the attention on “social 
7. Lempert, 2014.
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justice” in the constitutions and rhetoric of “socialist” countries of Asia and Eastern and 
Northern Europe, versus the Anglo-American countries, the idea of social justice seems 
partly related to ethnic factors (and climate, and geography that may underlie them) 8 
and partly to the kind of ethnic competition that exists within a complex system.
While the “political justice” and “rule of law” approach can be traced to many 
civilizations, going back to the first legal codes and to the development of international 
commerce, it is also particularly associated with societies and subcultures that have 
developed complex legal and literate traditions.
2.2. Measuring “Progressive” Politics Against Some Real Variables: 
Rephrasing the Question to Include Ethnicity
Who are the “Progressives”? Are they random groups that arise spontaneously with 
a social function of protecting interests and to keeping certain types of societies moving 
“forward” or are progressives a defined functional group (like healers or spiritual lead-
ers) whose existence and effectiveness can be correlated over time to measure historical 
“progress”? Do “progressives” only arise when societies confront difficulties and need 
to re-adapt to their environments to improve survival, or do complex societies create 
and protect a specific role for “progressives” within systems like education, religion, 
leadership, and communications? Given the changes in the roles of these institutions in 
contemporary societies, there are real questions as to whether or not there is a “natural” 
social role that humans have developed to promote long-term “progress” that goes 
beyond simple “stability” and continuity. However, if progress is measured in human 
societies over the past several generations, there seems to be a correlation between “pro-
gress” and the activity of particular minority groups. For political progressives (the third 
category above) in many societies today, there seems to be a clear correlation with Jews, 
while for social progressives (the second category above), any disadvantaged minority 
can fit that role. By looking at behaviors of ethnic groups, it is possible to develop some 
basic theories to try to measure how societies progress technologically, socially, and 
politically, and what the future might hold.
The place to start a search for a baseline on “progressives” is to look at the char-
acteristics of people who support progressive causes and to separate those “progres-
sives” who arise spontaneously within a system in order to change it for their individual 
interests and those whose characteristics are larger and unchanging. While political 
analysis is often defined by labeling that can hide the underlying alliances and actions 
of identifiable groups, one way to get around this dilemma is to look for these harder 
variables (more stable affiliations) and to move political analysis closer to anthropology 
and sociology, using quantifiable measures of age, gender, race and (though not entirely 
clear cut) ethnicity. That means taking euphemistic words such as “left” or “liberal” 
8. Lempert, 1993. 
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or “progressive” and trying to fill them in with categories such as ethnicity or age or 
class in order to understand what may really be going on in progressive decisions and 
modeling this over time.
In fact, there is some positive correlation between the different progressive agendas 
(technological, social, and political) and different ethnic groups. While there is a larger 
question as to whether ethnic groups spontaneously move to take on these roles due 
simply to factors of position or size, and to fulfill a certain social function in complex 
systems over time, it makes sense to start with a smaller question as to whether there 
are any identifiable cultural groups in our own time with these roles and to see how they 
redefine and change those roles over time.
The question that Klein asks is really a “shadow” question that can be analyzed by 
looking at specific ethnic groups; particularly Jews. Klein is identifying contradictions 
in the behavior of political progressives; the third “type” of progressive identified in the 
section above, whom she and the media have called “the liberal left.” The intellectual 
dishonesty that she detects consists of the willingness to accept a double standard for 
an unidentified reason. Since the mission of political progressives is to apply standards 
equally to all and to look for solutions that are systemic, she seeks an explanation as 
to the underlying causes that have led to the violation of this mission by people who 
previously expressed a strong support for it.
The way to turn the question about the “liberal left” into a question about Jewish 
political behavior is to use a simple anthropological trick. Anthropologists ask whether 
there is a fear or taboo of using a more descriptive word for the “liberal left” that is 
being hidden by a euphemism. If there is such a taboo, this underlying fear might also 
explain why the group might sometimes resort to breaking its own standards. To find 
out, we simply try out substitute words for “liberal left” or for other characteristics of 
individuals mentioned in the question or who are raising the question. We can also look 
for a parallel question to Klein’s question to confirm a starting point for this analysis 
and to relate it to a larger phenomenon. Here’s how.
In addition to Klein’s question about economic policy and specific individuals who 
have supported that policy at high levels, authors and journalists who have been defined 
as “progressives” of this “liberal left” (including Klein and Democracy Now) also pose 
a very similar question about military policy and international law. On issues such as 
use of the U.S. military or the support for foreign military actions in violations of inter-
national law and treaty agreements, they also raise questions about the unwillingness 
of the same “progressives” to enforce politically progressive standards on people such 
as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who was also rehired as part of the 
Democratic Presidential transition, and on former Assistant Secretary of State, Richard 
Holbrooke, who has been rehired as special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their 
assumption is that progressives should have been much more vocal and consistent dur-
ing the “Bush years.” That question can be situated in time to date back more than 
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three decades to 1980 and earlier, before members of the Bush family served as U.S. 
President or Vice President.
To derive a social scientific question that closely fits the problem, we can substitute 
the phrase “political non-conformist (independent) Jews” for “liberal left” in Klein’s 
question and the parallel question, above. The newly formed question is now striking 
and direct. 
Why is it that “politically non-conformist” (“independent”) Jews are “intellectu-
ally dishonest” (substituting some other goal for their long-held principles of rule 
of law and political progress) when it comes to blaming or holding accountable 
people like Summers, Rubin, Greenspan, Holbrooke (who are all Jewish), and 
Albright, (who was born Jewish)? 
Without assuming whether Klein’s world view is right or wrong, it is easy to simply 
rephrase her question for at least one potential and important group of political progres-
sives, in this way: 
Why have many Jews agreed to support stagnation in or reversal of global social 
and political justice while politically non-conformist Jews whose previous role 
was to push the world towards objective standards, have been turning away from 
upholding those standards? 
This may be the real unanswered question that was right in front of Ms. Klein’s and 
her interviewer’s (Amy Goodman’s) noses. Both are Jewish.
Similar substitutions can be tried using other ethnic groups to ask some similar 
questions about both political and social progress.
2.3. Opening a Window into the Larger Question of “Progress” by Examining 
the Political Behaviors of Jews and the Strategy of Political Progress in the 
Culture of Diaspora Jews
The identification of Jews as one important component of the “progressive left” 
makes it possible to measure one of the potential driving forces of “political progress” 
by examining how Jewish culture promotes and protects (or how it compromises or 
abandons) this strategy under different conditions. By examining how Jewish political 
behavior is changing overall and the size of “progressives” as a subset of the Jewish 
minority population over time, it is possible to come up with some conclusions about 
whether “progress” is specifically linked to cultures or whether it is only linked to the 
relative vulnerability of certain minority cultures at different points in time. The answer 
to this question has implications for overall human progress, for other minority groups, 
and also for Jews. The assumption here is that using Jews as an indicator of progres-
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sive politics makes some logical sense and is a good fit. Moreover, although it is not a 
perfect fit, since the identification of “Jews” or any racial, ethnic, or minority group is 
also socially constructed, it is a relatively stable category over time and offers a good 
starting point.
By contrast to movements for social progress that are rooted in most major religions 
and are not specific to Jews (even though Jews have long been associated with move-
ments for social justice through labor and political movements in the U.S. and Europe), 
the category of political progress is often associated with Jews today 9 and is one that 
offers itself to measurement (of quantity of effort, though the actual quality can be 
subject to dispute). While there is a debate as to whether this third concept of progress 
(of history moving towards some “ends” rather than repeating itself in cycles) is even 
a Jewish “invention,” there is a core Jewish philosophy of “tikkun olam;” of perfect-
ing institutions through law as well as a part of Jewish identity that reinforces survival 
against the forces of empires through legal and moral challenges to those empires. A 
central distinguishing idea in the Jewish religion is one that humans control destiny, 
not outside forces. According to this philosophy, Jews create meaning not only through 
ritual activity, as in other cultures, but in this activity of mending the world or perfecting 
the world. For Jews living in the Diaspora for 2,000 years, the essential definitions of 
perfecting the world have included the protection of small minority peoples and their 
chosen identities through concepts of rights (including rights to a “Sabbath” day each 
week free from labor and to the worship of one’s ancestors and God) and codified law 
(Commandments) within these larger systems. For the past century in the West, Jews 
have been over-represented in modern legal professions and have been a driving force 
in promoting concepts of civil liberties, rights, and protections through law and institu-
tional frameworks that are central to the concept of political “progressivism” 10.
Jews have historically represented a significant part of political non-conformist 
intellectuals and activists promoting a particular view about human and civilization’s 
progress and how individual decisions can be part of such progress. 
As a (Jewish) progressive, Klein expresses concern that (Jewish) political progres-
sives are abandoning their agenda and her observation can be tested with hard evidence. 
Assuming that a certain group of political progressives can be identified (and evidence 
in the next section suggests that Jews do fit this category and that Klein is observing a 
real change), it is possible to try to explain the change. Her worry suggests a belief that 
(Jewish) progressives are making a deliberate (and harmful) free choice. Jews (previ-
9. Civil liberties organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights and other 
organizations that have challenged government and economic power in the United States have a strong association with 
Jews and with Jewish lawyers and activists.
10. The Biblical story of Abraham and Isaac and the idea of the “covenant” and struggle between people (with each 
other) and with a concept of god in the Bible is one of the first stories on this theme. The story symbolizes the struggle to 
establish law and to bargain with the forces of human and scientific nature for human ends. However, many of the other 
stories of the Old Testament of the Bible that tell the story of Moses in Egypt are also reinforcements of a story of rights 
and law within the context of larger state systems such as dynastic Egypt. See for example, Lerner, 2002.
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ously a political progressive group) aren’t assimilating but are abandoning progressive 
traditions without any clear cause. Why would Jews give up an established cultural 
belief that society apparently defines in a positive way (as “progressive”)? 
Klein has put her finger on a key issue of both overall political progress and Jewish 
political identity that has at its roots some key decisions of how Jews in the world are 
now collectively interpreting their (our) survival interests and their (our 11) alliances. If 
Jews are giving up the ideal of political progress because they are on a path to assimila-
tion, this suggests that there is really no such thing as “political progress”; that it is only 
a ruse used by certain minority groups to promote their assimilation and that it will be 
given up once they feel relatively secure. Similarly, if Jews are giving up the ideal of 
political progress out of fear for survival (or a combination of relative security and some 
ultimate fear), can the idea of political progress ever really take root in human societies, 
or is it also subject to elimination through manipulation of fear? Given the position of 
Jews in the world today, how Jews are making this decision not only has an impact on 
U.S. and Middle Eastern politics, but on several concerns for the future of humanity 
and global survival in what many futurists describe as a post-oil, desertifying, resource 
depleted world, where the U.S. Empire is crumbling and where Asian and other power 
centers are emerging, without any particular minority group rooted in these traditions.
Does political progress require the existence of a particular group with a particular 
“politically progressive” tradition in order for the progress to continue, and if so, what 
happens when it give it up? Is political progressivism something that is “cultural” and 
specific to part of a once victimized minority group such as Jews that is independent of 
economic victimization? Can an ethnic group that initiates a progressive agenda that 
includes both social and political progressive features continue to support this agenda 
after the group is no longer disadvantaged? Or, does human “political progress” require 
continued victimization of a group to create the impetus for change (making it almost 
paradoxically impossible for real “progress” to be continued and sustainable)? If neither 
condition exists, is human progress really possible?
2.4. Progress or Regress?: Evidence of Recent Regressive Behavior of 
Minorities and “Progressives” in U.S. Elections to Generate Hypotheses about 
Ethnicity and “Progress”
It is relatively easy to generate data demonstrating the disappearance of support 
for political or social progress in the U.S. between 1980 and 2012. What is compelling 
about this general data is not only how strong the trend in the U.S. over the past (more 
than a generation) has been showing the decline of “progressivism” but also how close-
ly it follows ethnic lines and how at least one group in the U.S. (Muslims) is becoming 
more progressive. Changes seem to be related to the political and economic positions 
11. Including the author of this study.
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of those groups; with Jews and Muslims moving in opposite directions in progressive 
politics. Assuming the high education and political activity of Jews, the data on Jews 
is particularly intriguing. Overall, the findings offer a way not only for individuals to 
reconsider the basis of their own political behaviors and what they have chosen to give 
up, but to alert different ethnic groups as to what they stand for (if anything other than 
self-protection).
Most political scientists examine political data to measure the changing support for 
different coalitions over time but do not try to measure “progress” over time or support 
for “progress” among particular ethnic groups. While there is no reliable measure or 
poll of the absolute numbers of “progressives” in the three different categories of pro-
gressives identified above, it is possible to use some shadow measures to explore some 
trends and begin to offer hypotheses with polling data that does ask about ethnicity. 
In the United States, one place to start is with support for candidates in Presidential 
primaries (and particularly in the Democratic primaries) where activists more directly 
express their preferences than in Presidential votes. Recently, the creation of a “Progres-
sive caucus” in the U.S. Congress also offers a way to look at one self-defined group 
and their characteristics. Some comparisons between the voting for Congress, in Presi-
dential primaries and in Presidential elections also offer a window into the decisions 
that these “progressives” are making.
General data for elections in the United States for the past 35 years (now more than a 
generation and possibly long enough to confirm a trend) tends to confirm both that there 
is a general trend away from social and political progressivism among the very same 
people who were progressive before, and that Jews in particular are weaker than ever as 
political progressives. A longer look at data for Jewish “progressive” voting also shows 
this shift even more strongly in ways that tend to confirm that (Jewish) progressives 
have been making some kind of bargain that is counter to their previous progressive 
stance. Added to this, it would be interesting to measure if there is a trend away from 
science and technological progress globally (and a case might be made that there has) 
that could also be confirmed through other measures such as spending and dedication 
to pure science and the range of support to applied science and technology.
2.4.1. The General Trend
One way to look at progressive politics is to start by looking at national votes within 
the Democratic Party for the past 35 years. Although there can be “progressives” in any 
political party, and some Republicans (among them some libertarians and some profes-
sionals building standards on spending) take some “progressive” stances in line with 
the three types identified above, all current members of Congress’ “Progressive Caucus” 
are Democrats and the full range of issues that fit the definition of “progressive” has 
recently been associated with the Democratic Party. The way to look at the trends is to 
take candidate voting records and position and to hold them against the measures of 
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“social progressive” (second type) and “political progressive” (third type) to determine 
which candidates fit the definition, then to see how much initial support they received 
in primary elections. 
While historical interpretation introduces biases and the classification categories 
are imperfect, I have made some very rough interpretations of candidates for the past 
nine elections, putting candidates and their votes into three categories: non-progressive, 
progressive (including those candidates who are or were members of the Congressional 
Progressive Caucus since 1991 or whose records were similar) and a third “unclear” 
category. Of course, the classifications and data itself is rough, since not all candidates 
stay until the end of Presidential primaries, some votes are tallied in caucuses, not all 
candidates appear on each ballot, and so on. Support for globalization or for particular 
U.S. military intervention is also hard to interpret (is it for resources and control or for 
promoting rights and progress?). However, the data does offer an opportunity to put 
some numbers on an often-stated belief that in the U.S. there has been a major shift 
away from Progressive politics and that today’s “Democratic Party” candidates may be 
even more conservative (non-progressive) than even Republican Party candidates used 
to be more than a generation ago.
Other ways of conducting the analysis result in similar conclusions, including com-
paring political platforms or stresses of particular issues in campaign speeches 12. The 
purpose of the brief overview is just to set an initial baseline.
This table cannot suggest whether this phenomenon – the severe downward trend 
in progressivism, if correctly interpreted – is part of a “cycle” or the end of “progress”, 
and it is only for the United States. However, it is a first measure that can be viewed in 
an historical context with more data for specific ethnic groups.
12. In 2009, for example, one can make a quick comparison of progress in the U.S. simply by comparing the Inaugural 
addresses of John F. Kennedy in 1960, when the Democrats won a majority, with that of Barak Obama in 2009. There 
is clear attention to agendas of social progress (concern for the poor), for political progress (international standards 
through law and international organizations; civil rights as something higher than national law and part of a global goal 
of humanity, human understanding and peace in a joint effort rather than as the single country managing that effort) as 
well as to scientific and technological progress (space exploration, cultural advance, research on disease) in Kennedy’s 
speech. One can find almost all of these themes in President Lyndon Johnson’s inaugural address and other speeches, as 
well. Other than mention of progress made in civil rights and a nod to continuing efforts towards “equality,” all of these 
other “progressive” commitments were glaringly absent in Obama’s address, in his campaign speeches, or in current 
speeches that focus on meeting economic needs and on national and individual strength and position. 
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Table 1: Downward Trends in Progressive Voting in Democratic Primaries 13
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- Bradley (20%)
Clarke 
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Candidate 
Tagged as 
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Kennedy 
(38%), 
Brown 
(3%) 
Jesse 
Jackson 
(18%); 
McGovern 
(2%)
Jesse 
Jackson 
(29%); 
Simon 
(6%)
Brown 
(20%), 
Harkin 
(1%); 
McCarthy, 
Agran 
(1%)
None ?
Kucinich 
(4%), 
Sharpton 
(2%), 
Dean 
(5%)
Kucinich, 
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No 
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Progressive 
and Unclear 
Primary Vote
99% 94% 79% 42% Incumbent 20% 14% 2% 0%
Progressive 
Primary Vote 41% 20% 35% 22% Incumbent ? 11% <2% 0%
2.4.2. Jewish Progressives Over Time
The more interesting trend, also downward, is that of the “independent” party voting 
of Jews in the U.S. for most of the past century. If “non-conformist” Jews do represent 
the political progressives, their voting patterns would indicate that either the culture has 
been changed or that they are making the kind of hypocritical choice that Klein iden-
tifies. While there is no way of knowing how many Jews are “progressive” or which 
categories of “progressive” they fall into, there are clear records of their Presidential 
electoral voting for the two “Progressive” parties that directly chose this name in 1924 
and 1948 as well as for a social progressive party (the “Socialist” Party) in 1920, and 
whose political agendas reflected the goals of social justice and/or political progress. 
In more recent elections, it is possible to track Jewish support for candidates who rep-
resented progressive agendas of the Green Party that included social progressive and 
13. Data from Our Campaigns website. On web at: http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RaceID=55208
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politically progressive agendas (including one Green Party candidate, Cynthia McKin-
ney, who was a member of the Congressional Progressive Caucus).
Table 2. Politically Non-Conformist (Independent/”Progressive”) Jewish Voting in U.S. 
Presidential Elections
Candidate(s) Party Label Year Jewish 
Vote1
Popular 
Vote2
Jews as a 
Percentage3
Eugene Debs Socialist 1920 38% 3% 62%
Robert La Follette, 
Sr. 
Progressive 1924 22% 17% 7%
Henry Wallace Progressive 1948 15% 2% 31%
John Anderson
Barry Commoner
Independent 
Citizens
1980 14% 7% 10%
Ross Perot Independent 1992 9% 19% 2%
Ralph Nader Green 2000 1% 3% 2%
Ralph Nader Green 2004 1% 1% 5%
Ralph Nader
Cynthia McKinney
Independent 
Green
2008 0.5% 1% 5%
Jill Stein4 Green 2012 <1% 0.3% ?
1. Jewish voting data (percentages) is from: L. Sandy Maisel and Ira Forman, Eds., Jews in American 
Politics, 2001. on the web at: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/jewvote.html
2. The national voting data used for comparisons is drawn from published sources including Wikipedia 
articles on each election.
3. The assumption is that Jews are 4-5% of the vote; roughly double that of other groups. The Jewish 
tradition is one of active civic participation (making fate rather than accepting fate) and Jewish voter 
turnouts are high, while the average voter turnout in Presidential elections is between 40 and 60%. 
Bernard Avishai, “Obama’s Jews,” Harper’s, October 2008, page 9. Note that my calculations are rough 
given the overall imprecision of the data. For more specific figures, I would have to use the Jewish 
population of the country in each election year and also look at the exact voter turnout in each year.
4. Exit polls showed 69% of Jews voted for Obama and 30% for Romney with 1% unclear, even though 
the Green Party candidate, Jill Stein, was Jewish. There is some possibility that this data was skewed 
and that Jewish vote was higher but that Stein was simply excluded from the polling. Two “swing state” 
results were Ohio: 64 (or 69, depending on the poll):31.5: and 4.5 not explained; and Florida: 66 (or 
68): 30: and 4 not explained. Even if the third party vote is suppressed in the media polls and was 
4-4.5% in these states and maybe double that in non-swing states, it’s still way below past third party 
levels. However, it would suggest that a larger percent of the small vote for Jill Stein was from Jews. 
Stone, Andrea (2012). “Jewish Vote Goes 69% for Barack Obama: Exit Polls,” Huffington Post, posted 
November 7. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/jewish-voter-exit-polls_n_2084008.html
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Presidential votes in general elections are harder to use to show the specific strength 
of progressives, but they also reveal a startling pattern. In U.S. general elections for 
President, in what many have called the U.S. two-party “duopoly” system, choices 
have often become “strategic” votes where groups make bargains with the major Party 
candidates. Thus, actually votes may not directly reflect the numbers of progressives 
given that some progressives may have extracted promises from major party candidates 
in return for their votes. The ability to bargain effectively could be masking changes 
in progressive choices. What makes the table below so interesting is that it identifies 
elections where progressive Jews chose to vote strongly for the Third Party candidates, 
rather than put faith in bargain with one of the two major Parties.
There is no way to know the actual thinking of Jewish progressives in making these 
votes; whether they felt their Third Party votes were important in moving the overall 
political debate (for political progress) and/or in protecting Jewish progressive as a 
recognized bloc (social progress for Jews). Following the 1920 and 1924 votes, the 
Democratic Party did become progressive under Roosevelt, for example. Following 
1948, however, Jews were heavily targeted in the McCarthy era purges. Yet, there is 
still a clear pattern in the votes.
What is important to see in the table is that Jews had a tradition of voting for Third 
Parties and not blindly identifying with the Democratic Party (part of the recent com-
mon wisdom). They apparently did use their voting power strategically for Third Par-
ties, not just between the two major parties. Moreover, they made up large parts of the 
vote for the Socialists in 1920 and for Henry Wallace’s Progressive Party (against the 
Cold War) in 1948. They were also significant in 1980 in support for John Anderson, 
an anti-war candidate. Yet, more recently, they have fallen behind other groups in their 
Third Party voting.
Graphing the data shows the phenomenon more clearly.
Figure 1. The “Disappearance” of Jewish Progressives
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Since 1980, Jews have made a clear switch. The data might or might not indicate 
a general progression of Jewish voting that could suggest some kind of assimilation. 
But it could just as easily suggest that voting (and “assimilation”) represents a specific 
political choice of alliances that would confirm Klein’s observation that Jewish progres-
sives are acting against their stated principles.
2.4.3. The Congressional “Progressive Caucus” and Ethnicity
Ethnicity figures for the U.S., for the U.S. Congress and for the U.S. Congressional 
“Progressive Caucus” offer general information about ethnic groups and “progressive” 
choices on a more national level, and also suggests that Jews are becoming less pro-
gressive. While Congressional voting in the U.S. is by district and its members do not 
clearly reflect progressive sentiment of minorities, there is a rough correlation.
While the U.S. Congressional “Progressive caucus” has only existed since 1991 and 
data cannot be used to show any real trends, its membership itself offers some clues 
on ethnic lines as well as on issue choices of what currently constitutes “progressive” 
politics and also of the relative role that Jews and other ethnic groups play in it.
Below is a chart for a recent Progressive Caucus for which data were available (in 
office for 2007 and 2008) with tabulations of Congressional membership by ethnicity. 
Note that all of the members of the Caucus are members of the Democratic Party.
The interesting numbers in the table are those that suggest that progressives are 
probably social progressives representing the interests of disadvantaged minorities since 
the composition of the group is higher than that of minorities who are “disadvantaged.” 
Blacks make up almost half of the caucus and Blacks, Hispanics, Jews, and Asians are 
62% of the members. Moreover, of Blacks in Congress, some 61% are members of the 
Caucus compared to 13% of all members of Congress.
Table 3. Analysis of the U.S. Congressional Progressive Caucus, 110th Congress, 
by Ethnicity 14
Ethnic 
Group5
Number of 
Members 
in 
Congress 
(Both 
Houses)
Number of 
Democratic 
Party (or 
Independent) 
Members
Number of 
Members 
in Caucus
Percentage 
of Democratic 
Party (or 
Independent) 
Members in 
Caucus
Percentage 
of Total 
Group in 
Caucus
Percentage 
of Total 
Caucus
Blacks 44 44 27 61% 61% 38%
Hispanics 29 23 8 35% 28% 11%
14. The 110th Congress served in 2007 and 2008. The raw numbers were tabulated from lists and biographies in 
Wikipedia and on the Web.
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Ethnic 
Group5
Number of 
Members 
in 
Congress 
(Both 
Houses)
Number of 
Democratic 
Party (or 
Independent) 
Members
Number of 
Members 
in Caucus
Percentage 
of Democratic 
Party (or 
Independent) 
Members in 
Caucus
Percentage 
of Total 
Group in 
Caucus
Percentage 
of Total 
Caucus
Jews 44 42 7 17% 16% 10%
Asians 7 7 2 29% 29% 3%
Other 314 162 27 17% 9% 38%
Total 
(including 
non-voting 
members)
538 278 71 26% 13% 100%
5. These minority groups account, overall for 30+% of the national population (Blacks at 12.3%; 
Hispanic at 12.5%; Jews at 2-3%; Asians at 3.6%). 2000 Census data. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
“Population Profile of the U.S., 2000,” reported on the web at: 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/files/2000/chap02.pdf
The statistic for Jews is also interesting. Only 16% of Jewish members of Congress 
are now members of the Progressive Caucus; not much higher than the percentage for 
non-minority members (9%). Among Democrats, Jewish members of the caucus are in 
the same percentage as non-minority Democrats. It looks as if Jews who might other-
wise be “progressive” had made a bargain with the mainstream Democrats.
2.4.4. The Disappearance of Progressive Agendas in Politics Among Most Minority 
Groups, Throughout the Political Process: Minority Progressives Making Some Kind of 
Compromises or Surrender of their Agenda in 2008, Apparently for Identity Politics
The recent choice of Jewish progressive voters to support the Democratic Party 
candidate in Presidential elections, rather than to give support to progressive Third 
party candidates is reflected by the behavior of several minority groups, even in primary 
elections, suggesting that not only are progressives NOT using bargaining power when 
they do vote in the general elections, but also they are generally abandoning progressive 
stands overall. The way to see this is to combine data from U.S. Presidential prima-
ries with the self-definition of “progressive” by those members of Congress who were 
Presidential candidates in primaries. It seems that progressives are no longer voting on 
issues but are seeking protection by voting for candidates who are from their ethnicity 
or who will choose staff from members of that ethnic group, no matter what their politi-
cal preferences are.
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Table 4. Projected Support in Voting if the Public Supported the Progressive Caucus’s 
Presidential Candidates in the 2008 Democratic Primaries 
Ethnic Group Percentage 
of Overall 
Democratic 
Party Affiliation, 
Estimated by 
Voter Turnout and 
Democratic Vote 
in 20086
Percentage of 
Democratic Party 
(or Independent) 
Members in 
Progressive 
Caucus
Percentage 
of Democratic 
Primary Votes for 
Caucus Members: 
Kucinich and other 
“Progressives” 
not in Congress 
(Gravel)
Percentage 
of Democratic 
Primary Votes 
for Non-Caucus 
Members: 
Obama, Clinton, 
Edwards, Biden, 
Dodd, Richardson
Blacks 23% 61% 0 to 9% 91 to 100%
Hispanics 6% 35% 0 to 33% 67 to 100%
Jews 2% 17% 0 to 100% 0 to 100%
Total7 31% 26% <2% 98+%
6. CNN Exit Polls, November 4, 2008, reported on the web at: http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/
results/polls/#val=USP00p1 Data is then repercentaged over 53%, the total Democratic vote.
7. Unsourced data presented in Wikipedia, “Democratic Party (U.S.) Presidential Primaries 2008, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_(United_States)_presidential_primaries,_2008
With the basic data on minorities and “progressive” voting, as represented by the 
above data for the Congressional Progressive Caucus, it is possible to take a look at 
national voting behavior among these groups in 2008, both in the Presidential primaries 
where activists are more likely to vote their interests in hoping that they can influence 
a nominee and policies, and in the general election. What is interesting about the 2008 
elections is that there were candidates who were members of the Progressive Caucus 
(including Dennis Kucinich and Cynthia McKinney) running against several candidates 
who were clearly not members of the Caucus. Barack Obama, for instance, is among 
the minority of Blacks in Congress who did not identify with the Progressive Caucus.
Overall, while 26% of the country’s Democrats were members of the Congressional 
Progressive caucus, their candidates received less than 2% of the primary votes.
There is not enough data to know exactly how individual ethnic groups voted. Pro-
gressive candidates report that they did not have the funds to do this kind of polling 15. 
At best, it is only possible to make mathematic estimates and for smaller groups like 
Jews, it is impossible to see anything. But for Blacks and partly for Hispanics, the data 
is clear. Progressives did not vote their political views in the primaries.
Black progressives apparently voted for a Black non-progressive candidate in large 
numbers (Obama) because he was Black. Hispanics may have voted in larger numbers 
15. E-mail from Vin Gopal, Deputy National Campaign Manager for Kucinich’s 2008 Presidential campaign, January 
4, 2009.
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for the non-progressive Hispanic candidate, Richardson. It looks as if progressives 
bargained away their interests on the basis of some other definition of their interest or a 
co-optation of those interests in the primaries. The data here on Jewish progressives is 
too small, but the same questions about their choice can start to be raised, partly on the 
basis of where Jewish money went if not Jewish votes 16.
The same phenomenon is also visible in the election, itself, where Congresswom-
an McKinney, a Black Progressive Caucus member, was pitted against non-member 
Obama.
Apparently, progressive members of different minority groups were not voting on 
issues but were making a strategic decision to ally with non-progressives. The progres-
sive vote almost entirely disappeared.
One can raise questions about why the “progressive” vote for Congress is so dif-
ferent than that in the Presidential election process and whether there is a belief that 
Congress, itself, and its progressives, can pressure a President. There is also a question 
of whether the Congressional data is really a valid representation of “progressives.” 
The question that Klein is raising suggests that Congressional progressives, very much 
like national progressive voters, may have also made deals once they were in office, to 
support (or to look the other way at) activities of their non-progressive colleagues and 
of Presidential staff, and their appointments to high positions. This data does not offer 
clues as to why progressives seem to have chosen to make deals, and what interests they 
think they are protecting by making deals that suggest an inconsistency in their beliefs. 
This question that can be taken up using a different approach, in the second part of this 
article.
Before trying to understand why “progressives” have agreed to suppress or abandon 
or trade their agenda, it is important to ask whether there are any progressive minor-
ity voter groups who apparently chose not to make such a deal and to ask what might 
be different about them. In fact, there is one. The only minority that did not make this 
bargain with non-progressives, was American Muslims.
16. One report describes Jews as 20% of Democratic Party donors, though they are only 5-10% of its voters. Avishai, 
2008. Jewish money went first to Hillary Clinton, then to Obama. Though I have not analyzed political or ethnic 
dimensions of money, it is important to recall California Governor Jerry Brown’s comments in 1992 that the real primary 
was the “money primary” and not the competition for votes.
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Table 5. Projected Support in Voting if the Public Supported the Caucus’s Candidates in the 
2008 National Elections for President
Ethnic Group Percentage 
of 2008 
Voters8
Percentage of 
Progressive 
Caucus of 
National 
Representatives
Percentage of 
National Votes 
for Caucus 
Members9: 
McKinney
Percentage 
of National 
Votes for Other 
“Progressives”:
Nader/Gonzalez
Percentage 
of National 
Votes for 
Non-Caucus 
Members: 
Obama
Blacks 13% 61% 1.0% (Combined) 95%
Hispanics 9% 28% < 2.0% (Combined) 67%
Jews 2% 16% 0.5% (Combined) 78%
Total 100% 13% 0.2% 0.5% 52%
8. CNN Exit Polls, November 4, 2008. Note that the Jewish vote is only reported at 2% when sources 
generally find Jews voting at about 4-5% of the electorate. Given that there was a 62% turnout, Jews 
could have been overrepresented by 50+ if they all voted, pushing their share to 4+%. CNN reported an 
“Other” category of religions of 6% that may include some of the Jewish voters if they did, indeed, vote in 
large numbers in the election. 
9. CNN Exit Polls, November 4, 2008, supra. 
2.4.5. American Muslims: Minority Progressives Not Making the Bargain
Of all minority groups in the U.S., the one that appears to be more progressive while 
other groups are less progressive, is Muslims. The question is why, and the answer 
suggests that they are also acting on the basis of identity politics in protecting their 
interests. What seems to make them different is that they are one of the groups that the 
Democratic Party does not seem to welcome into its coalition.
There is very little data on the Muslim and Arab-American vote, given their small 
size, although their vote may actually be as large as that for Jews 17. But there are surveys 
of their voting behavior in 2000 and 2004 when they suddenly moved from a standard 
U.S. voting pattern including support for Republicans, to the left. There is a good expla-
nation for why. This was a group who, while not “disadvantaged” economically in the 
U.S., was suddenly a victim of discrimination and civil liberties violations as a result of 
U.S. policy regarding the Muslim world. Many had a direct interest in supporting the 
civil liberties agenda of political progressives as a way to protect themselves.
Using some available data, it is possible to see that they voted strongly for Ralph 
Nader, a political progressive candidate in the 2000, 2004 and 2008 Presidential elec-
17. It is difficult to know what percentage they are of voters but they are estimated at 2 to 12 million in the census. 
Wikipedia offers sources that they vary from 0.7% to 4% of the population. 
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tions who is not Muslim but is Arab-American and who spoke out as a defender of 
Arab-American and Muslim civil liberties. Assuming that Muslim Americans are 3% 
of the electorate, their votes for Nader would have accounted for about 0.6 of the na-
tional vote which was 20% of the Nader vote in 2000 but almost all of it in 2004 and 
2008. This table also explains why Nader did so well in states like Michigan. It wasn’t 
just blue collar voters and auto workers supporting him. It was the Arab and Muslim 
minority there.
Table 6. Muslim-American Vote in Recent Presidential Elections 18
Year Republican Democrat Nader
2000 8% 72% 19%
2004 (Polls) 2% 54% 26%
/Repercentaged 2% 67% 32%
This is not to say that there are no Muslims or Arab Americans welcomed in the 
Democratic Party, but simply an analysis of specific voting behaviors 19.
18. Fleischer, 2004. Note that these figures are slightly lower in polls of “Arab-Americans” but show the same trend. 
The Zogby International poll found that in 2000, 44% voted for Bush, 38% for Gore and 13% for Nader. In the 2004 
election, the numbers were 28% Republican, 63% Democrat and 8% for Nader; a decrease rather than the increase 
indicated in the table. The pre-election polls in 2008 were indicating 6% for Nader. Arab-American voters were estimated 
at 2 million, slightly less than 2% of the electorate. By these figures, they could have contributed to about one quarter 
of the Nader vote in 2008. Mineeia - Lobe, 2008.
19. U.S. Senator and diplomatic envoy, George Mitchell, is part Lebanese Christian ancestry, similar to Ralph Nader. 
Mitchell, however, does not speak Arabic and has not spoken out for political protections for all Arab Americans 
including Muslims, as Ralph Nader has.
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3. Part ii: Progressivism and the Current “Jewish Question”
A standard explanation of U.S. (and global) political behavior in recent times that 
suggests the weakening of progressive movements, even in the face of growing eco-
nomic inequalities, attributes the change to both the increasing power and sophistica-
tion of control mechanisms (including media and propaganda) by elite actors. Yet, that 
explanation seems to fail, not only because it denies the underlying assumption that 
people make rational choices that reflect their interests but because it does not recog-
nize a competing trend of increasing knowledge and cynicism among citizens as well 
as easier access to alternative sources of information and communications. An analysis 
based on rational choice suggests that progressives were making a rational choice to 
suppress their agenda and to deaden movements for progress. The rest of this study, 
focusing on Jews but applying to other groups, argues that the choice is really one be-
ing made out of fear and perceived self interest. The araticle also seeks to project these 
choices to logical conclusions that are startling (and horrifying) for the future of Jews, 
of humanity, and for concepts of “progress.”
What the U.S. Presidential election results in 2008, analyzed above, suggest is the 
fact that minority voters, who are most likely to be progressive, were making choices 
based on identity politics rather than on political agendas. (Given the incumbency of 
Barack Obama, 2008 is used as a clearer base year for analysis.) There is evidence that 
politicians can co-opt progressive segments by their own ethnicity or by the filling of 
positions of people with that ethnicity, regardless of whether or not they share that 
agenda; symbolic tokenism as convincing people they are represented or that they, too, 
can win the lottery. The larger question is, why minorities would want to agree to this 
given that majority populations apparently feel free to support candidates who repre-
sent their interests even though they are from minority groups. Moreover, why is it that 
progressives, who are arguably more educated and ideological than others, agree to this 
choice? While the 2008 electoral results raise some questions about Black progressives 
and their allegiances, the rest of this article focuses on Jewish progressives and their 
choices over the past several decades in the U.S. and outside of the U.S. Others can deal 
with the implications of this for Black progressives in the U.S. since a study of Jews 
should have similar implications for Blacks and other minorities.
Even if elites have been using money and media to drive progressives out of politics, 
this would still not fully explain why progressives, themselves, have long been con-
vinced by the messages. One would still have to examine the messages and arguments 
that have been used to convince progressives to make concessions to support different 
agendas in order to understand their beliefs.
Underlying this question are assumptions about how history and progress work and 
how groups and cultures make decisions and changes that are too complicated to fully 
address in this article. Social scientists, themselves, are split into whether they think 
choices are rational and based on perception of self-interest or irrational and manipulat-
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ed by advertising, fears, shallow appeals, or even on how “self-interest” is defined and 
understood in the brain. For arguments sake, the rest of the article assumes that Jewish 
progressives are thoughtful actors in their voting and other political behaviors and that 
even their motivations based on fear are part of some underlying rational or logic of self 
interest. Another important assumption for measuring behavior and attitudes towards 
progress is the fact that rational choices are being made in an environment where the 
very context in which choices are made is relatively constant over time and that people 
are aware of that context 20.
It is important to also accept a frame of analysis for measuring history and to assume 
that history is a process that individuals affect by aggregate choices on their interests 
and how they define those interests, and that this is a conscious choice by individuals, 
added up into a collective choice. That is different from looking at human choices as 
driven by a collective consciousness of larger forces that drive decisions beyond indi-
vidual conscious choice. Those who look at history from a macro-view in long sweeps 
of time for the rise and fall of civilizations, including this author in other work 21, could 
see the same data and the story it tells as just part of a larger process and might assume 
the insignificance of human action and decisions 22. Even though it may be difficult to 
link individual behaviors to collective social changes and to work on these two levels at 
the same time, this article assumes that there is some consistency between these levels.
Progressives themselves assume that ideas count and that philosophies and human 
choice move history. At the very least, the rest of this piece tests progressives’ own as-
sumptions when applied to their choices to see whether their own choices solely reflect 
rational survival interests or whether progressives also perceive choices between longer 
term and short term interests of humanity and of their own group definition (i.e., Jewish 
progressives as wedded to a strategy of promoting political progress) and act in that 
way 23. 
The rest of the article examines these issues by looking at the context in which 
Jews make political choices and what these choices reflect. The overall question is 
20. Minorities may find themselves as the frogs in a boiling pot, unable to really assess changes around them or to 
recognize that the concept of who they are and what is “progressive” or what is the nature of the world around them is 
changing. Anyone reading this article might also have to put themselves in an “objective” framework to hold several 
things constant, and that may not be possible. See, for example, Foucault, 1985. For an historians’ classic view of the 
complexities, see Meyerhoff, 1959.
21. That piece looks at current history moving towards corporate global feudalism that will stop any kind of 
movements towards progressive politics in a return to a new feudal age, albeit with the current level of technology. That 
article starts with different assumptions of history and a different level of analysis.
22. See, for example, Tainter, 1988 or Spengler, 1926-1928.
23. Some of the classic historians of the 20th century raised this question in looking at development in the U.S. and 
Europe. Charles Beard’s work analyzes the U.S. constitution, a politically progressive document, in terms of economic 
interests and raises questions about whether it is really what it says and whether it really represents progress at all. Beard, 
1934: 219-229. Arnold Toynbee’s view of rise and fall of civilizations was not that it was an organic process but that it 
could also be defined by choices made by innovative groups. If Jewish progressives are one of those groups, their ability 
to hold to a consistent agenda and promote a belief is a test of whether this idea of human choice is really a relevant 
historical phenomenon. Toynbee, 1956.
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whether Jews are visibly (consciously or subconsciously) sacrificing progressive poli-
tics for identity politics or some other short-term tradeoff, and whether this trade can 
be measured and explained. The piece then examines the long-term implications for 
Jews, themselves of this choice and whether Jews, themselves are conscious of the real 
implications of the short-term tradeoff they have made, given that similar tradeoffs in 
recent memory have been associated with genocide against the Jews when empires Jews 
have allied with have failed and when progressive resistance was weak. There is also 
a striking parallel to this choice – this “Jewish Question” – that Jews have made in the 
Middle East. An understanding of that choice helps to challenge much of the common 
wisdom and myth about Israel’s position in the world today. Finally, the changing power 
relations in the world today offers an opportunity to test Jewish choices, Jewish progres-
sive politics, and the future of progressive politics overall in human history.
3.1. The “Jewish Question” and Its Theoretical Implications: Are Jews 
Assimilating and Agreeing to An End to Progress or Are they Just Making a 
Temporary Bargain?:
Since there is enough evidence to suggest that Jews as a political group are not as-
similating in the U.S. in ways that would make them indistinguishable from the main-
stream, why is it that they appear to be turning away from progressive politics? Are 
Jews assimilating in some other way that is causing them to turn away from progressive 
politics to simply protect themselves, indicating that Jews 24 neither really were nor will 
they continue to be a culture that is politically progressive? If they are not assimilating, 
are Jews in the U.S. simply making some short-term (possibly misguided) decisions 
for protection that are conflicting with other values? This question of assimilation and/
or making some kind of alliance for self (group) protection is the essence of the “Jew-
ish Question” 25 (a survival strategy in relation to the powers that be). It is also a key to 
understanding whether a cultural strategy for political progress is independent of the 
conditions of a small ethnic group or whether it is simply a mechanism for self-pro-
tection that is discarded once conditions of that group improve. Given that the Jewish 
re-establishment of a nation state and the rise of Jews in the U.S. and other countries to a 
position of economic and professional status have occurred in less than the past century, 
there is not enough data yet to offer a clear answer. However, there could be enough 
data in the next few decades to provide one given that it is at least clear that Jews have 
sacrificed progressive politics in the short term. Putting these decisions directly in social 
context, to understand the logic of the choices (the Jewish answers to the “Jewish Ques-
24. In referring to the “culture” of American Jews, it may be better to define the group as “Ashkenazic” (Eastern 
European émigré) Jews, which describes almost all of the American Jewish population.
25. Marx, 1975: 211.
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tion”) and the potential consequences, points the way to measure continuing changes 
and what they mean. 
The evidence that Jews are retaining some cultural difference in the U.S., other 
than just a religious preference now that they have given up “traditional” or identify-
ing dress, grooming, and language, is in their distinct set of political preferences that 
reflects a cultural choice rather than simply economics. While many Jews are as wealthy 
as most American conservative elites, they still do not vote with conservatives. While 
data above described Jewish voting patterns in the U.S. over much of the past century 
for Third Party (progressive) candidates in Presidential elections and suggested a trend 
towards assimilation, Jewish voters have not assimilated. The rest of the same data 
set, highlighting the Jewish vote for the Democratic Party and comparing it to national 
voting in the U.S., shows that Jewish voting has also been consistent over time. The 
Jewish vote for the Democratic Party is higher than that of the general population or 
they historically break off from the Democratic Party to vote for Progressive candidates 
who challenge the Party (up until the past 25 years). This pattern has held remarkably 
constant although there was a small shift in the 2012 election (not shown on the chart) 
with 69% for the Democratic candidate.
Figure 2. Consistency of Jewish Political Identification with the Democratic Party and Lack of 
Overall Political Assimilation
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While there is a question as to whether the whole “political spectrum” in the U.S. 
and elsewhere shifts as all minorities assimilate into urban culture and/or assume similar 
economic position and status as other groups, there is still continued immigration to the 
U.S. and Western European countries. This is part of an arguably continuing process of 
cheap labor exploitation or brain drain where Jews continue to form coalitions with new 
minority entrants and groups who are more easily identifiable as minorities.
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Those who survey the specific views of Jews, beyond their electoral choices, also 
find that Jews remain more progressive on both issues of social justice and political jus-
tice/ civil liberties, than the population overall and the Democratic Party. For instance, 
70% of Jews rejected the Iraq war as early as 2005 26, although they continued to support 
candidates who voted for it or funded it.
3.1.1. Defining the “Jewish Question”
The “Jewish Question” – the question that Jews as a minority group have always 
had to ask – is how they would define themselves in relation to the majority group 
and to its enemies. Anthropologists generally write about identity as not only a set of 
distinguishing traits of a group but also as a way of setting boundaries and distinguish-
ing a relationship to others (to “the other”). While the standard question about Jews 
is whether they are “assimilating,” the real human choice is not between becoming 
one thing or another but about positioning oneself and one’s group between different 
groups; particularly between those who are defined as “allies” or “friends” and those 
who become “enemies” or “others.” In the U.S., the question about “assimilating” is not 
about becoming some inexact and undefined part of the U.S. elite, Christian, culture, 
but about how a group defines itself in relation to all of the other minorities inside the 
country (blacks, Native peoples, Latin Americans, Asians, and Middle Easterners) and 
to those outside the country.
In every country that Jews have lived, they have had to define the traits of the 
majority culture that they would adopt as their own and others that they would keep, 
and to think about how this positioned themselves as a group for survival of the group 
given the potential for future internal strife in the country and future invasions and wars 
outside of the country. Identity is partly self-defined and groups decide to stress certain 
traits or symbols not only to reinforce their own systems but to remind themselves of 
where they differ from other groups and whom their allies should be. For Jews in a Eu-
rope that was often divided between Christians and Muslims (the Moors and the Turks) 
or between West and East (the Slavs or migrating peoples from Asia and the Caucuses), 
between landed and nomadic peoples, Jews defined themselves in relation to these 
lines of conflict between the majority peoples, seeking to secure their status by picking 
winners and losers. Divisions between neighboring countries in conflict were also prob-
lematic and required Jews to choose. At times of invasions or repelling of invasions and 
the rise and fall of empires (invasion and overthrow of the Turks, for example), Jewish 
survival was dependent on how they were perceived by both sides of the conflict.
Indeed, much of the basis of Jewish identity as “politically progressive” can also be 
described as part of how Jews defined themselves as a minority people with a small area 
of resources, seeking to survive in a world of empires; the Babylonians, the Egyptians, 
26. Avishai, 2008. 
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the Romans, the Greeks, up to the Russian and U.S. Empires of our day. The creation 
of an identity as politically progressive was based on the ideal of a small group able to 
maintain its sense of differences and to survive the rise and fall of empires around them, 
in league with other small groups seeking to do the same.
Karl Marx’s answer to the question of Jewish identities that he posed in his own 
writings, was to try to create a new kind of assimilation through homogenization and 
destruction of all identities. It was an assimilation that was socially progressive but that 
largely avoided political and legal systematization. It didn’t work particularly well to 
protect Jewish ideals or Jews, themselves. Among those who were purged in the 1930s 
in a backlash to the failures of this system as it was applied in the Soviet Union were 
the many Jews in the Communist Party and in the State apparatus who tried to override 
traditional Russian culture and create a new identity 27. Many of the Jews who survived 
are now in the U.S. and Israel where they have had to ask the “Jewish Question” again 
to define what their new identity would be and how they would establish new alliances.
Apparently, Jewish progressives in the U.S. have made a trade, agreeing to support 
U.S. elites and to avoid criticism or standards. That bargain has required accepting the 
definition of the U.S.’s enemies and sharing the spoils without asking too many ques-
tions. It would only be logical that the amount by which progressives have agreed to 
silence would be in some direct relationship to their benefit (and embarrassment) and/
or in direct relationship to their feelings of insecurity (making the value of the benefit 
seem to be greater). Logically, then, it would seem that if Jewish political progressives 
have been silent it is because they perceive themselves as increasingly insecure.
3.2. The Trade That Progressive Jews Have Made: Explaining the 
“Intellectual Dishonesty”:
The first part of this paper presented a chart of Jewish “progressive” voting in U.S. 
progressive elections, showing very strong Third Party progressive votes in 1920 and 
1924, then in 1948, then in 1980. While the overall progression looks like a “trend,” 
these three peaks could be explained as something else. It could be that Jewish progres-
sives were acting independently at those three times because they were not yet forced 
to make a “choice” to support a set of political elites. Between 1928 and 1944, the Jews 
in the U.S. were faced with a choice of being independent or joining with elites during 
a time of economic crisis and the European Holocaust. Between 1952 and 1976, they 
were forced to make alliances during the Cold War. After the Cold War, since 1984, 
there has been a new choice. One way of understanding the suppression of Jewish po-
litical progressives is to look at the “Jewish Question;” the fears and choices that Jews 
faced in the U.S. for self protection during the Cold War, the current “War on Terrorism” 
(against countries that are largely Muslim) and the deep fears and concerns that might 
27. Lempert, 1998.
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motivate these choices and that go beyond the standard explanation that it is merely to 
“protect Israel”. After examining the real historical choices, it is possible to retell the 
history of Jewish politics and progressive choices through the prism of identity politics 
and self-protection.
There seems to be a common wisdom in U.S. political analysis based on the fact 
that Jews have largely defined their activism in relation to Israel and protections for 
Israel as a homeland. But from an economic and military standpoint, Israel has been 
much stronger, safer and more secure in the past 30 years than in its first 30 years, and 
that assessment would largely be true even without the military support that it receives 
from the U.S. 28. If that is so, the real insecurity that Jews in the U.S. perceive, and that 
has driven them to support elites in the U.S., more likely comes from fears they have 
in the U.S. 
This perspective reverses the view of the role of Israel in the political activity of 
Jews in the U.S. The politics and activism of Jews in the U.S. is not driven out of con-
cerns for protection of Israel, given that Israel is now largely in a position to protect 
itself. The choice that U.S. Jews have made is one of supporting U.S. military interests 
in relation to their sense of their own security, and rationalizing this as the protection 
of Israel and of all Jews.
In an earlier article, more than a decade ago, on the Cold War 29, I drew direct atten-
tion to one form of intellectual dishonesty of Jewish intellectuals that began in the 1950s 
and carried through to the 1980s; the willingness to fictionalize much of 20th century 
Russian history in order to serve the interests of American elites in the Cold War and to 
boost their own careers by doing so. Now that the Cold War is over and U.S. elites have 
defined a new “enemy” and a new “war” (or set of wars) to further their interests, there 
appears to be another set of deceptions to which many Jews in the U.S. have joined to 
further their careers. Moreover, the rewards are now greater, earning Jews not only mid-
dle class success but also positions high in the political establishment. Nevertheless, it 
seems that Jews (and other minorities) feel no more secure today in the post-Cold War 
U.S. than they were during the Cold War, or at least feel that they now have more to 
protect and are equally vulnerable. The pressures that led Jews to violate their profes-
sional integrity in order to boost their position during the Cold War seems to be the same 
calculus that now drives the politics of progressive Jews, in general.
28. U.S. military aid to Israel is current $3 billion per year, which is only about 1.5% of the total GDP of some $200 
billion. Sharp, 2008: Israel’s per capita GDP of $25,000+ ranks it with European countries and among the top fifth of 
countries in the world. Although Israel relies heavily on the U.S. for its trade – 20% of imports and 40% of exports – this 
isn’t a subsidy and is roughly equal to Israel’s trade with Asian partners that continues to grow.
29. Lempert, 1998: 457.
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3.2.1. The Jewish Question and Progressive Politics During the Cold War
In the 1990s, in work as a young scholar of Russia and the Soviet Union, I noticed 
how many parallels there were in the history of the Russian and U.S. Empires, including 
the purges of Jews in both countries at the start of the Cold War, the use of ethnic quotas, 
and the labeling of those with family histories on the two sides of the Iron Curtain as 
somehow suspected of being disloyal. In Russia, the quotas worked against those who 
were called “Cosmopolitan” while in the U.S., the label used in blacklisting was “Un-
American” or “Pink” (not pure White, Anglo Saxon, Protestant establishment). Yet, 
few scholars dared to conduct real social science of comparative “Empires.” Until only 
a few years ago, the very word “empire” was, itself, taboo in descriptions of the U.S.
During the Cold War, American Jews boosted their careers by turning their anger 
against Russian and Eastern European peasant cultures that uprooted their families, 
against the labels like “Marxist” that U.S. elites used for countries outside of the U.S. 
Empire whose resources and markets were not open to it. Jews were able to show their 
“loyalty” to American elites, and distanced themselves from Jews like Karl Marx and 
other Jews or part Jews like Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, by bashing the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe while remaining mostly silent about the U.S. Empire and 
inequalities. They also accepted the fabrication that there was no real cultural continuity 
between the Tsarist Russian Empire, which traded with the West and accepted foreign 
investment, and “Soviet” Russian Empire, or between the “Soviet” Russian Empire and 
the post-Soviet Russian Empire under most of the same leaders or their relatives, who 
once again agreed to trade and investment with the West. 
As the first U.S. anthropologist in urban Russia, some 25 years ago, I also began to 
draw the parallels between the economic policies that caused the collapse of the Soviet 
Russian Empire with those in the contemporary U.S., focusing on a number of choices 
under Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s, and the economic policies of de-regulation, reli-
ance on military spending, decline in national investment, widening gaps between elites 
and masses, which were almost in direct parallel to those of the Reagan Administration 
that the two leading U.S. political parties have continued since then 30.
What I began to note then was that many of the same U.S. Jews who were agreeing 
to falsify Russian history and social science and to avoid comparisons that would have 
directly challenged injustices and policy failures in the U.S., were also soon to become 
involved in the “transition economy” schemes that helped loot the former Soviet Union 
of its capital and intellectuals at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. Harvard 
Jewish economists such as Jeff Sachs and Larry Summers, World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn, and others were able to join the Jewish intellectuals writing about the Cold 
30. Lempert, 1996. In President Obama’s first term, these policies continued under the Democratic Administration, 
with only occasional hints of some investments in research and development, but little change in military spending, 
distributional equalities, or citizen oversight of government and powerful non-governmental institutions. This has 
continued in his second term as of this writing.
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War by offering the structural adjustment “solutions” of “shock therapy” to those coun-
tries in ways that offered them the same psychological catharsis with career promotion. 
They could release Jewish anger against the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
while advancing their own careers. By doing so, they avoided any mention of the fact 
that the solutions that were needed to actually rebuild economies in the collapsing Rus-
sian Empire were the same kinds of investments, regulations, and policies in the U.S. 
Empire. At the time, I referred to it as “Building Democracy with Mirrors,” deflecting 
attention away from the reality on both sides of the divide 31.
During the Cold War, many Jews were able to make their careers by making these 
deals, and many of them appear to believe after a time that the compromises they had 
made were their own real beliefs. Those who had emigrated from war torn Europe and 
had learned to shed identities and seek friends were probably acting out of a sense of 
self-protection (Henry Kissinger and Madelyn Albright among them) while others who 
were second and third generation immigrants were filling their psychological need for 
security and belonging in their newly adopted countries. The longer they played the 
game, the harder it was to see that it was a game and the deeper they all sank into a sense 
of unreality and detachment from their sense of professionalism or their own sense of 
self and values.
3.2.2. The “Jewish Question” and Progressive Politics, After the Cold War: Context and 
Nature of the Trade
What has happened since the end of the Cold War is that the choice (and the source 
of benefits) has changed. While it was easy before for Jews to turn their anger against 
Russia and Eastern European countries with the Holocaust fresh in their memories and 
with the centuries of positive co-existence of peoples silenced in the graves of their 
ancestors, the calculus of how to rise professionally in the U.S. now required that Jews 
turn their anger against different enemies; those who held the resources that U.S. elites 
craved. 
Several Jews including Henry Kissinger, the architect of President Nixon’s foreign 
policy in the late 1960s, with close ties to the Rockefellers, found that they could rise 
to prominence and position in the U.S. by championing the new goals of the U.S. Em-
pire; advances on oil in countries that are largely Arab and Muslim or, like Richard 
Holbrooke, on the resources of Asian countries. The founders and early adherents of 
the “neo-conservative” movement included Jews such as Richard Perle, who supported 
the U.S. Cold War and then the brain drain of Jewish intellectuals from Eastern bloc 
countries, and who quickly moved to support for U.S. domination of the Middle East, 
Caucuses and Central Asia. It even began to run in families. Irving and William Kristol, 
Donald and Robert Kagan, and other Jews began to push U.S. militarism in a way that 
31. Lempert, 1996. 
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promoted U.S. elite interests and their own. At the same time, they made the claim that 
doing so was in the interests of Jews as a whole because it enmeshed Israel in this new 
web of U.S. imperial interests. While promoting these interests in government, they 
also found that it was quite lucrative outside of government, at the head of law firms 
or consulting companies on investment risk. Former Assistant Secretary of State, later 
managing director of Lehman Brothers, Richard Holbrooke, typifies how support for 
U.S. militarism could also be part of careers that would then open up the revolving door 
to great wealth in work for investment banks that profited from the pillaging of econo-
mies that fell to U.S. power and to the application of similar economic rules in the U.S.
In short, now that the Cold War is over, Jews demonstrate their “loyalty” to the U.S. 
oil companies and consumption. They do so by supporting and promoting invasions of 
Arab countries that have oil, and by agreeing to the militarization of Israel as a country 
with a racist policy against Muslim Arabs, regardless of whether or not it makes sense 
in the history of Jewish-Arab relations or in the future of the Middle East.
While it is clear how a few Jews have been able to make their careers by picking 
the winning horse in competition among Empires and by writing the history or ration-
alization for those acts, the question is why Jewish progressives (and most U.S. Jews 
today) have also agreed to participate in these deceptions given that Jews have increas-
ing security in the U.S. in general. Although it could be that Jews have changed and 
are no longer as educated or critical as they may have been at other times in the past 
(something that seems unlikely given that Jews have risen precisely because they are 
educated professionals), that argument starts with an assumption that there is no real 
benefit – even short term – for Jews for going along with what appears to be a contradic-
tion. It makes more sense to start by looking for some explicit benefit or interest, even 
if it is based on fear, to rationally explain this behavior today, now that the Cold War 
is over. What are ordinary Jews getting, what are they giving up, and why do they feel 
that they need to make this bargain?
The trade that politically progressive Jews and other minorities have made in the 
U.S. is a simple one. It appears to be the same trade that has enabled some Western 
economic systems to maintain legitimacy despite the perpetuation of structural injus-
tices of poverty and hierarchy. A few positions are opened at the top of the system – in 
economic and political power -- in a kind of “lottery” where no one is excluded simply 
on the basis of ethnicity. At the same time, there is one specific difference that seems to 
have muted the political progressives; the openness of political positions and not just 
economic ones, well beyond simple “token” representation. 
The two sides of the bargain are as follows. 
On the one hand, Jews agree to support the overall international agenda of U.S. 
hegemony and the creation of enemies to fit elite desires for resources and markets. In 
the past, that enemy was defined by the Cold War; now it is largely defined by oil and 
divisions between the Christian and Muslim worlds that reflect those resource divisions. 
On the other, minorities also agree to support the financial de-regulation that has pro-
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moted economic gains from (in many ways, looting, of) weak countries. They agree not 
to push for standards or enforcement of laws or building of new systems.
What they get in return is a respite from internal hegemony and targeting within the 
U.S. that characterized the country before its rise to the status of a global power. They 
get the positions in major institutions – government, universities, the media – that were 
previously closed to them and that were used directly against them. At the same time, a 
number of them are able to take the system’s riches as its equal; not simply as its profes-
sional servants on a second tier (lawyers, engineers, civil servants, doctors) as before. In 
fact, it may be that all of them are partly sharing in the riches and are entwined in them 
because their very positions of status as lawyers, engineers, civil servants, and even 
doctors, is fueled by the resources and spending of the system, and they are investing 
their gains back into that system. This, itself, is the standard process of assimilation. 
Groups that rise in the system increasingly feel the need to defend that system and give 
up their identity in the process.
There is nothing new about this overall approach to incorporating minorities who 
call for social and political justice. The bargain in the U.S. is an example of the same 
system in which minorities were able to rise in Germany prior to the Nazis, in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to its collapse, and slowly in the Russian Empire before 
its collapse. However, there is one significant difference. In all of those cases, minorities 
were able to attain economic power but never had major positions of political leader-
ship. Now, the bargain is including visible political positions that reflect the economic 
status. At the same time, that power is almost entirely symbolic, creating the illusion of 
change and protection but without any real progressive agenda behind it (and often the 
very opposite) that would protect the system, itself, the ideal of “rights” and protections, 
and the cultural protections. 
Nevertheless, this still does not answer the key question: If Jews are richer and more 
secure, why are they not even more forceful in promoting their progressive ideals that 
were central to their identity? What would they really lose or fear that they could lose? 
To answer the question requires looking deeper at Jewish motivations and at the idea 
of whether a culture that is really “progressive” can continue. Before getting there, it 
is important to see how deep this transformation has gone and to see what roots it (its 
visible structure, described more fully in the rest of this subsection), and then at its 
deeper structure and the causes of these changes, including deep-seated fears (in the 
next subsection). 
The cause and effect of this change in Jewish political behaviors since the end of 
the Cold War is not entirely clear on its surface and probably has occurred through both 
“push” (demand for positions and representation in the system) and “pull” (recognition 
by elites that minorities could be co-opted to join the system through representation and 
would not effectively change anything) but is not essential to seeing the phenomenon. 
The impact and depth of this change can be seen not only in the numbers of Jews who 
have risen into the political establishment – an effect that is beyond tokenism and looks 
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more like the “mining” of the political system by elites, with minority representatives – 
but also the transformation of Jewish political “progress” into actual regressive policy.
3.3. Beyond Tokenism: Elite Mining of the Political System with Ethnicity in 
Ways that Co-Opt Progressives on the Basis of their Ethnic Affiliations
In the U.S. and elsewhere, “tokenism” has long been an approach taken by majority 
groups to promote their interests and to appear to be listening to disadvantaged or under-
represented groups in ways that stall or thwart pressures for actual systemic change. 
Sometimes progressives have achieved important positions only to find themselves 
isolated as minorities in organizations or in government where they are represented 
but still have no real power. In recent years, however, the naming of minorities to high 
positions has increased whereas “establishment” opposition to their selection has de-
creased, particularly as prominent members of minority groups have offered to serve 
in roles protecting the establishment. The discourse among minority group members 
has long been that the representation of these groups is a sign of “protection” or even 
of “advancement” of the interests of these groups into a mainstream agenda. Yet, in 
recent years, the sheer numbers of minorities who have offered their services in sup-
port of non-progressive agendas has apparently created such cognitive dissonance that 
many political progressives themselves now describe this advance as evidence of their 
progressive agenda being fulfilled. The means has somehow now become the ends.
The way that the system is increasingly working is that Jews and other minorities are 
in the very positions that are viewed or presented as those where the progressive inter-
ests of the disadvantaged group can best be protected if they are ultimately threatened, 
even although the systems, themselves, and the people in those positions may actually 
be supporting policies that are regressive; in reverse of political and social progress. 
The answer to Klein’s question about why progressives are silent about President 
Clinton’s economic team that has been reconstituted in personnel and spirit in President 
Obama’s administration, and why progressives were also “dishonest” in refraining from 
criticism of Clinton’s policies and even his personal behavior, is an example of this sub-
stitution of means for ends. If you insert the “J” word and ask why “Jewish” political 
progressives might have muted their voices against regressive or illegal actions by Jews 
and their colleagues, the question itself becomes rhetorical after adding a few simple 
statistics. Nearly half of Clinton’s second cabinet was Jewish. Both of his Supreme 
Court appointees were Jewish. The Presidents of the World Bank and the Federal Re-
serve during his tenure were Jewish. Jews were the architects of his globalization policy 
as well as his international military policy. None of these policies were “progressive” 
but many were even described in terms of Jewish values and protection in ways that 
sought to mute Jewish criticisms, including Clinton’s violation of international treaties 
to bomb the Serbians. When Jews rushed to Clinton’s defense on charges of perjury, 
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many were willing to overlook that he was perjuring himself over sexual relations with 
a Jewish woman in his office 32.
When George W. Bush’s administration pushed forward with the national security 
state to erode civil liberties, the Head of Homeland Security was Michael Chertoff, a 
Jew from a family of rabbis and Talmudic scholars who seemingly offered the assurance 
to Jews that they would at least be temporarily protected. Senator Diane (Goldman) 
Feinstein’s rise on the Senate Intelligence Committee similarly muted concerns that the 
Democratic Party was not sensitive to torture and violations of international law; at least 
temporarily not against Jews, and that their spouses and family could also financially 
benefit from military contracts. The recent list has also included the appointment of 
Judge Laurence Silberman, to co-chair, and Yale’s first Jewish President Rick Levin as 
a member of, the Robb-Silberman Commission – the Iraq Intelligence Commission to 
investigate the U.S. invasion of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. Appointments 
and individual positions like these have served as mines or “booby traps” to defuse pro-
gressive calls for structural advance because they are seemingly vetted by high ranking 
Jews who are assumed to offer protections of the interests of those minorities.
During the 2008 Presidential campaign while Jews originally rallied around New 
York’s Senator Hillary Clinton, Obama’s selection of Jews on his team was also made 
clear in signals through the national media as a notice to progressives that their interests 
would be protected even if Obama’s real stands on progressive issues were unclear (or 
regressive). Depending on how one defines it, some 30-40% of Obama’s inner circle 
around the time of his election consisted of Jews 33. Although Obama did not name Jews 
to his initial cabinet, his campaign manager and chief consultant, and his Chief of Staff 
were both Jews, as was Vice President Biden’s Chief of Staff 34.
A few weeks before the 2008 Presidential election, a number of prominent political 
progressive intellectuals who are Jewish – Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Ira Chernus, 
Norman Solomon among them – recommended to other progressives that they support 
Democratic Party rather than any of the progressive candidates; arguing that the Demo-
cratic Party candidates might at least be willing to “listen” and might be convinced to 
32. The key cabinet members in Clinton’s second cabinet, out of 12 total cabinet members, include Albright (born 
Jewish but not practicing), Rubin and Summers at Treasury, William Cohen (half Jewish) at Defense, Mickey Cantor 
at the Commerce Department (replacing Ron Brown, of African American descent), and Dan Glickman at Agriculture. 
Though both of his Supreme Court picks were Jews, the percentage among other federal and appeals court judges appears 
closer to the actual percentage of Jews among prominent lawyers.
33. Of 30 people identified by the New Republic in November 2008 as the most important advisors or allies in the 
Obama Presidency, including advisors, fundraisers, and political figures, it is possible to identify at least 9 of 25 of them 
as Jews and two others as of Jewish ancestry. The Jews are David Axelrod, Rahm Emmanuel, Larry Summers, Penny 
Pritzker, as well as Austan Gulsbee, Joel Benenson, Andy Stern, Julius Genachowski, and Jason Furmin. James Steinberg 
is possibly of Jewish ancestry (not confirmed). (Four others are not identifiable by ancestry: Peter Rousse, Greg Craig, 
Phil Griffin and David Plouffe.) Two others: John Kerry and Nicolas Sarcozy (the French leader, who is included as an 
influential ally) are part Jewish. Note that there could be a selection bias in the story since the author is likely Jewish 
and might overly weight Jews as influential. Scheiber, 2008: 14. If you search the web, you can also find various blogs 
describing Obama as the “first Jewish President.”
34. David Axelrod, Rahm Emmanuel and Ron Klain.
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follow some progressive ideas. Their discourse largely followed the terms of identity 
politics, noting candidate and advisors’ racial and ethnic background as part of the belief 
in that openness 35. 
This change is not limited to high political positions and is reflected elsewhere in 
society. It began in the University system roughly two decades ago, with affirmative 
action policies to promote the rise of minorities and women. Yet, what is striking about 
these changes is how they have had little if any impact at all on making the university 
structures or the teaching methods more politically progressive. The faces of profes-
sors has changed and textbooks may have been replaced but the system remains as 
undemocratic in terms of student and community responsiveness and accountability as 
it was before, if not more regressive 36. Rather than transforming disciplines internally 
to turn economics, law and other key disciplines into subjects that are responsive to 
communities and minorities, the disciplines themselves have been fractured and new 
interest group disciplines have developed to appeal to various constituent groups such 
as racial and sexual minorities and women. There is also some anecdotal evidence that 
university positions in some disciplines that were once held by politically progressive 
Jewish men have now been filled with social progressives who are visibly members of 
racial minority groups or who are women. There is also some evidence –despite being 
little studied – that this new identity politics has been part of a transformation of the 
social sciences into representational journalism, eliminating the goal of an objective 
social science, promoting human progress on understanding of human behavior and 
solving human problems 37.
3.4. How Progressives Have Even Reversed Progressivism in Making this 
Bargain
What potentially makes the “intellectual dishonesty” of Jewish political progres-
sives even more disturbing to those who believe in the goal of human progress is the 
fact that the decision to support a short-term calculus based on ethnic or identity politics 
threatens to undermine the credibility of even the idea of political progressivism, if it 
has not already done so. That makes progressives’ short-term trade one that discredits 
the very individuals who previously identified as political progressives, and requires 
others who are not tainted by such contradictions but who have no direct link to the 
tradition, to take their place.
Among the key achievements of political progressives in the 20th century was the 
movement to create and codify international legal principles in ways that sought to tran-
scend politics. The ideals of creating genocide and humanitarian laws and protections 
35. These articles and debates appeared on many different internet sites such as “Common Dreams.”
36. Lempert et al., 1996.
37. Duncan, 2013: 61-87.
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as well as empirical and objective measurements of fair processes largely advanced on 
previous concepts of “contract” and natural rights. The momentum of the Great De-
pression and two World Wars gave an impetus and legitimacy to this attempt to move 
civilization forward through systems for political progress.
There was a belief in the 20th century that civilization was advancing through law 
and education. One of the principles at the heart of this view was the idea established by 
the Nuremberg tribunals that imperialism and genocide could be stopped by establishing 
individual liability up and down the chain of command to citizens at all levels. In many 
national legislatures, including the U.S., a sign of advance was not only the amount of 
education of members but their familiarity with these laws and legal principles.
What gave progressives momentum and leverage was the ability to argue that any 
kind of support for violations of these legal principles was a sign of voiding of those 
principles and regression for human civilization. The idea of individual responsibility 
for collective action meant that legislators and citizens would not only be politically re-
sponsible and subject to removal but would also be legally accountable and responsible. 
In a country where a political leader might act to violate international laws by kill-
ing innocent civilians or disrupting their cultures to steal their resources or to avenge 
a family vendetta or for reasons of religious or racial hatred; or were to act in a self-
interested or reckless way to jeopardize human rights; or would seek to justify torture; 
or were to use political power to engage in criminal enterprises favoring cronies and 
disrupting international systems using public funds, any legislator or citizen knowingly 
supporting those activities would be guilty of aiding and abetting these crimes under 
principles of law. Those not using their power to seek removal of those officials could 
also be legally accountable.
The personal belief or “side” that one supported was no longer a relevant defense to 
such actions. It might “explain” the actions but it would not excuse liability for them. 
The only excuse could be one of self-protection for an immediate and recognizable 
threat, not just a vague feeling of unease or some other sensitivity. The line was very 
clearly drawn. It had to be clearly drawn in order to push individuals and societies fur-
ther forward and to prevent them from slipping backward.
Overall, the disintegration of rule of law in the West is partly the unwillingness of 
progressive (and other) Jews to hold themselves to the same standards that an independ-
ent system of law would require to hold others accountable. The intellectual dishonesty 
is that Jews cannot enforce or advocate for adherence to rules when members of their 
“tribe” have broken the same rules for protecting “their” financial and military inter-
ests. This hypocrisy is destructive both of the Jewish role and of rule of law principles 
in general. The undermining of credibility with contradictory actions also weakens the 
very system of enforcement. That marks an end to human progress.
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3.4.1. Deeper Reasons Why Jews Have Made the Trade and Agreed to Follow the Few 
Co-Opted Elites
Given the ramifications of this bargain for Jewish progressives, for human progress, 
and for Jewish culture and identity, the question is either what has made this trade seem 
to be of such apparent importance or what has made continuation of a Jewish politically 
progressive struggle seem to be pointless at this time in the history of the U.S. and of 
the world? After considering different hypotheses, the one that seems to better explain 
a re-emergence of conscious (and probably more sub-conscious) fear among Jews who 
stand out, is the fact that there is an important need for Jews in the U.S. (and Western 
Europe) to demonstrate that they are “not Middle Eastern,” “not Arab”, and “not Mus-
lim” in order to protect themselves from facing the increasing and real discrimination 
that members of these groups now face in the West due to the new struggles over re-
sources in the Arab and Muslim world.
On its face, there were no visible threats to Jews in the U.S. or in the world at the 
end of the Cold War that were not seen as due to expanded U.S. militarism or to Jewish-
Palestinian relations. The quotas that kept Jews out of top universities had already ended 
in the 1970s 38 and the discrimination that led many Jews to undergo cosmetic surgery 
in order to blend in to American society (informally referred to as “de-Yiddification”) 
declined after that time. Jews in the U.S. who are under 35 probably do not have di-
rect experience with anti-Semitism in the U.S. Most had already learned the lesson of 
shaving their beards and long hair so as not to look like Jews who had been turned into 
enemies (Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and others) and to find other ways to dissociate Jews 
who could have been seen as historic enemies of the U.S. or Western countries from 
any link to contemporary Jews. 
The real threat that Jews may face today is being identified with the new “enemy” 
that has been defined by all the leading powers in the world since at least the late 1970s 
and then intensified in 2001, not only in the U.S. and Western Europe but also in Russia 
(in its attacks on Chechnya) and in some Asian and African countries. In the past, Jews 
were literally cutting off their noses (“fixing” them) to spite their Middle Eastern faces 
and to blend in. Now, that separation is more of a political one. Jews do not want to be 
mistaken for Muslims or Arabs in the West. It is this fear of new discrimination and of 
the arbitrariness of Western military and police power that has apparently triggered a 
heightened anxiety and urgency among Jewish progressives of their need to conform, 
in much the same way as Jews were terrified into disavowing their Russian and Eastern 
European origins during the Cold War.
A personal experience highlighted this for me in an African country in April of 2002 
where I was working for the United Nations. I walked past a U.S. Information Services 
library on a Saturday and asked the guard to tell me the opening hours. Within a few 
38. According to Karp & Oren, these hidden quotas formally existed at Yale until 1974. Karp - Oren, 1986.
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seconds, I was held at gunpoint, thrown into the back of a police van and taken to a local 
police station where I was interrogated for almost an hour. The reason I was held, de-
spite presenting my passport and even a business card identifying me as a previous U.S. 
Fulbright Professor was because I “didn’t look like most other Americans” who were 
“taller,” heavier, and whiter. I looked as if I might be part Middle Eastern or Caucuses 
descent as Jews (and many eastern “Caucasians”) are. That put me on the list of physical 
types to be treated with suspicion around any U.S. office, even a library. This was not 
the only time that I have been confused with Arabs or Muslims around the world and it 
was an awakening to the prejudices and suspicions that these groups feel and some of 
the harassment that they face now in the world 39.
The reasons that are usually given to explain why Jewish and other political progres-
sives have been wise to abandon progressive politics in political campaigns are based 
on a number of assumptions that sound plausible as “rational” explanations but they do 
not seem to have the same explanatory power of one based on fear, particularly given 
the kinds of behaviors that seem “intellectually dishonest” or contradictory. The almost 
extreme distancing of some Jewish political progressives from others who seemingly 
hold their agenda, the unwillingness to bring them into coalitions (Ralph Nader, in par-
ticular, whom they had previously lionized in the 1960s) and the unwillingness to apply 
standards against members of minority groups, suggests that identity politics and fears 
of discrimination are the strongest motivations.
3.5. Testing and Discarding Alternative Explanations, Including “Voodoo 
Politics” for Why Jews Have Abandoned Progressive Politics
Among the different explanations that progressives in the U.S. offer for why they 
have increasingly supported the least worst of non-progressive major party candidates, 
even in political primaries, and why they have backed off of pressures for action on 
specific issues that otherwise define their agenda once their candidates are elected to 
office, are that: the least worst candidates will be receptive to undefined “pressures” or 
good nature to support progressive agendas, that the worst candidates will be so intrac-
table that progressive agendas will be set back further, that politics is so corrupted and 
political figures so powerless that voting and political activities only represents a choice 
on one or two dimensions of civil liberties and protections (such as abortion rights for 
women), or that non-progressive candidates who are minorities or who choose them will 
break a glass ceiling that will pave the way for a progressive agenda in an undefined 
future. Each of these issues makes sense on its face but largely reverses arguments 
that political progressives used in the past about how their integrity and steadfastness 
39. In Southeast Asia, people who see me as a “Western” man with a beard and Jewish features often said that their 
first identification of me was a reminder of Osama Bin Laden; the stereotypical image of someone with Middle Eastern 
features and a beard as distinguished from the clean shaven Western European face and physique.
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were essential and successful in forcing their agendas to be included first, before any 
compromises or actions on faith. Moreover, it offers no explanatory reasoning of why 
the past strategy needed to be abandoned and how something else would actually work.
The idea offered by Jewish progressives that support for “lesser of the two evils” 
positions would effectively create the pressures and impetus for progress through an 
apparent willingness to bargain, appears to be the modern corollary of the Reagan era 
mantra of “trickle down economics.” That approach was deemed “voodoo economics” 
and can equally well be labeled as “voodoo politics.” In fact, the evidence of such a 
strategy over the past generation seems to be that compromise by progressives is taken 
for weakness and that it reverses rather than promotes progress. The idea of speaking 
softly is also out of step with the Jewish progressive tradition of speaking truth to power 
and seeking to win the higher moral ground as a way to convince others and motivate 
action on an ideal of human progress.
It is difficult to prove that either the Jewish vote for political progressives or other 
steadfast progressive movements have actually been the triggers for reform, but it seems 
even harder to prove the opposite. The data on Jewish voting above demonstrated that 
Jews responded to the cyclical rhythms of U.S. politics and political scientists have long 
sought to link political shifts (and progress) to these rhythms 40. In fact, it is difficult to 
claim that Jewish progressive votes for progressive candidates were either the trigger or 
part of the pressure for political “realignments” or overall governmental policy shifts 41. 
In 1948, for instance, the Jewish vote for Henry Wallace may have been part of trying 
to stop the shift towards the Cold War and purges. Did Jews help moderate the shift 
or did they create an opportunity to be scapegoated? Time series data, itself, does not 
offer a conclusive answer. If critical elections or policy shifts are actually the result of 
lags in political and economic planning that fail to catch up with population demands 
(and unemployment or underemployment of youth), one might not even expect to find 
greater activism among Jewish progressives in these specific elections unless Jews were 
both part of the unemployed and had an agenda with specific solutions 42. The argument 
is inconclusive.
A similar justification is that the “lesser of the evils” offers a way for minorities to 
break through the final barriers of glass ceilings and to create a more level playing field. 
But this argument also seems to be illogical since it substitutes identity characteristics 
for political views and ultimately splits or co-opts and dilutes progressive movements. 
The experience with “tokens” suggests that it does not itself lead to progress. More 
likely, this argument is a rationalization for certain groups assimilating and trying to 
save face when they do so.
40. Elazar, 1978.
41. Burnham, 1955: 3-18.
42. Lempert, 1987. 
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The more interesting argument that also seems contradictory is that political can-
didates have little real power and that progressives should support them to influence 
one or two significant rights. In recent elections in the U.S., the argument has been that 
politicians are largely irrelevant, that an “establishment” holds power and progressives 
or disadvantaged groups cannot influence it. The best that they can do is to win a few 
concessions on a limited number of progressive issues like social welfare and abortion/ 
women’s rights. The argument that seems to be used to justify this choice has largely 
been that candidates will choose “Supreme Court” justices who will have long term 
impact on social issues. What makes this argument confounding is that usually the same 
people who make it also make contradictory arguments that the choice of the lesser 
evils is also important for other major decisions and that the power of politicians is so 
great that even shades of difference have major implications. Moreover, the choices of 
Supreme Court members in the U.S. have largely been made with identity character-
istics in mind; with recent choices including two Jews (by the Democratic Party), two 
women (one from each major party) and a Black (from the Republicans). If anything, 
the focus on Supreme Court nominations tends to reinforce the idea that the appeal is 
really towards identity and “protections” to a group (women or minorities) more than 
towards ideals of progress.
These explanations also do not elucidate several other phenomena in U.S. politics 
in recent years. Why, for example, have both Jews and Blacks been so antagonistic in 
recent years to the progressive candidates to the extent that they have not sought any 
real accommodation of them and have preferred to seek to scapegoat rather than build 
bridges? There seems to have been much less antagonism to progressives for support 
of other progressive candidates, including John Anderson, even though the Democratic 
Party was also adversely affected in 1980. What would explain outbursts by Congress’ 
Black Caucus against Ralph Nader who was effectively advocating their views and 
seeking to push the Democratic Party to incorporate rather than to discard them?
With none of the alternative explanations serving to describe behavior of progres-
sives and Jews, the way to see how well the identity politics explanation fits is to sub-
stitute for it in the retelling of recent political history and to see how well it actually fits 
that history. Moreover, the history can be projected into the future, allowing for further 
confirmation and testing of other related hypotheses or for refining it, if the current rise 
of the Jewish political candidate, Senator Bernie Sanders, at the time of writing of this 
article, demonstrates any kind of shift.
3.5.1. Retelling Recent U.S. Political History of Jews and Jewish Progressives from the 
Perspective of Identity Politics 
The simple explanation of human choices may be the best explanation, and that 
seems to be the case for describing Jewish political behavior in the past several genera-
tions. Members of a minority group who fear being victims of attacks and who have 
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little real power against the attacker, or believe that they are weak, would appear to be 
making a rational choice (at least in the short run) to try to find a way to ally with the 
attacking group and to distance themselves from other potential victims. For Jews in 
the 1950s and through the Cold War, the safest place to be once it became clear that the 
elites would attack those affiliated with rights movements in Russia and Eastern Europe 
was to distance oneself from them and from one’s heritage in those countries and to seek 
protectors in positions of power. In the 1970s and intensifying in the past decade, when 
the new enemy became Muslims and Middle Easterners who opposed U.S. exploitation 
of their resources, the safest place to be was to distance oneself from one’s heritage in 
those countries and to assure that one had protectors in positions of power. In contem-
porary U.S. and European politics, the fear and need for distancing applies equally well 
to Jews, given their Middle Eastern origins, and to those of African descent, given the 
influence of the Muslim world there. The way to test it is to examine the political history 
again while introducing this variable and to see how well it does.
An earlier assumption in this article is that the strong Jewish vote for Henry Wal-
lace’s Progressive Party in 1948 represented an outpouring of Jewish political pro-
gressive traditions in an effort to move civil rights in the U.S. and international law 
forward after World War ii and to head off movements towards a Cold War. But an 
alternate – or complementary – explanation is that this vote was also one based on 
identity politics and self-protection. It is possible that many Jews were voting against 
the Cold War in an effort to rebuild ties with their relatives (or at least their heritage) 
in Eastern Europe. Although Israel was also granted independence in 1948, many Jews 
were still living in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary and other countries of the Eastern bloc. It 
is possible that there was a hope that the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union against the 
Nazis and the joint effort of Jews in the Soviet Union against the Nazis could have led 
to improvements for Jews in those countries. Many Jews in Hungary and Yugoslavia 
were prominent in government positions immediately after World War ii, although they 
did not draw attention to their Jewish heritage. In fact, discrimination against Jews on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain began to intensify from 1948 onwards, as the Cold War 
intensified and Jews were suspected to have alliances with each other that crossed over 
the lines 43.
43. While the internal killings in the Soviet Russian Empire in the 1930s were disproportionately focused on non-
Russian minorities including Jews, in what I have described in my works on Russia as a “Russian nationalist backlash” 
and a demographic crisis rather than a “Stalinist” or “Communist” action, the specific targeting of Jews did not really 
begin until the Cold War. There are no estimates of how many Jews were killed in the Soviet Russian Empire under 
Stalin of the 5 million or so who may have been in the country in the 1920s, since that would also require estimates 
of the Jewish peasant population in Ukraine who died in the 1930s famine (the “war against the peasants”) as well as 
lists of Party members. Records are confusing since the Nazis liquidated 2 million Jews in Ukraine, the Balkans, and 
Belorus and Leningrad was under siege, with these earlier deaths being hard to distinguish. The totals could run into the 
hundreds of thousands but are unlikely to be more than 20%; a multiple of the 7% (2 million in purges and 8 million in 
famines of a 1926 population of nearly 150 million) of the overall population of the Soviet Union that may have died 
in the 1930s.. See Lempert, 1998.
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The McCarthy era purges in the U.S. worked on guilt by association, not on evi-
dence of any wrongdoing, and this also reinforced the idea that protection was not a 
matter of legality but one of networks. Minority groups learned the lesson in the 1950s, 
including many Jews whose careers suffered by blacklisting and the determination that 
they were “Un-American.” Most Jews did not follow McCarthy’s aide, Roy Cohn, who 
became a staunch anti-Communist, and many of them disputed Jewish Judge Irving 
Kaufman’s imposition of the death penalty in the famous espionage trial against Julius 
and Ethel Rosenberg in 1951, but they also separated themselves from those who were 
under attack and were selectively silent.
While many Jews were split in the late 1960s and 1970s over support for Richard 
Nixon given that Henry Kissinger had helped engineer a policy that would maintain 
support for Israel and for emigration of Soviet and Eastern European Jews, there was 
still a strong Jewish progressive movement. Moreover, the ideal of having a half-Jewish 
President named Goldwater (Goldwasser) in 1964 had almost no appeal at the time for 
Jews given that the opposing candidate, incumbent President Lyndon Johnson, had 
signed two major Civil Rights bills and was spearheading the campaign for social jus-
tice in the “War on Poverty.” In the Kennedy Administration, that Johnson had assumed 
after Kennedy’s death, two of the ten original cabinet members were Jews and one of 
two Supreme Court appointees were Jewish 44.
By the 1970s, Jewish political progressives had become emboldened and major 
party candidates in the U.S. were incorporating ideas for political progress as well as 
social progress in their agendas. What led to the changes since the 1980s and fears 
among minorities in the U.S.? The rise of Islamic fundamentalist liberation movements 
promoting control of local resources and social justice for peoples in the regions of 
the Middle East to Central Asia and the rapid condemnation and scapegoating of these 
movements as terrorism by U.S. and Western European elites seem to have created this 
fear. 1979 was the year of the Iranian revolution – the “Islamic Revolution” – and the 
capture of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by an indigenous Muslim populist movement 
against Western colonialism. 
The transition in 1980 from Jimmy Carter’s Presidency was one that could have 
created fear among Jews and other minorities who did not demonstrate support for the 
ruling elites. In Carter’s cabinet there were always at least three Jews (out of a total of 
12, later 13 members). In Ronald Reagan’s there was only one, a converted Jew, and of 
five Supreme Court appointees there was only one minority (Jewish) and his nomination 
was withdrawn 45. The newly emerging enemy that the U.S. and the West were identify-
ing as the Soviet Union was collapsing was the Islamic world.
44. Arthur Goldberg, the Labor Secretary, was appointed to the Supreme Court. Abe Ribicoff was Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare.
45. In the Reagan Cabinet, Casper Weinberger, who was an Episcopalian of Jewish descent, was Defense secretary. 
Douglas Ginsburg was the Supreme Court appointee. The Carter Cabinet was expanded when the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare was split. Jewish appointees during the Carter years included Harold Brown (Defense), W. 
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The emergence of anti-colonial movements in the Middle East raised new fears 
for Jews (and Blacks), unlike the anti-colonial movements in much of Asia. Jews and 
Blacks could voice their support for anti-colonialism in countries of Asia where the U.S. 
had no real thirst for resources, but the rise of the oil producing and exporting countries 
and the power that they could exert on oil prices and supplies made support for their 
autonomy or for social justice movements appear “anti-American”.
There were reasons why Jews felt the need to distance themselves as far as pos-
sible from the Islamic Revolution. The way historians write that history now suggests 
that these nationalist and populist revolutions were a threat to Israel and to Jews, even 
though one of the first things that the new Iranian government sought to do was to as-
sure Jews in the country of religious freedom and security. In fact, the cause and effect 
are likely to be reversed. It is because the very history of Jews in the region, the very 
basis of Jewish progressive ideals, and even the independence of Israel from colonial 
powers all echoed the actions that the Islamic Revolution had taken in the very region 
where Jewish history was born 46. It was an uprising by the ancient Persians (forerunners 
of modern Iran) in 537 B.C.E. whose struggle actually liberated the Jews from imperial 
domination.
The very stories on which a politically progressive Jewish identity is founded in the 
Middle East are those that dangerously echo the Islamic Revolution and that could also 
make the loyalty of Jews living in contemporary Western empires, suspect, again. The 
history of Jewish survival is one of terrorist tactics in the struggle against empire and 
solidarity, achieved through religious fundamentalist appeals. The three major holiday 
festivals, commemorating key events in Jewish history and political ideals are Passover, 
Hannukah and Purim. The first two depict a fundamental struggle against empire and a 
military to achieve independence, while the third describes strategy in the palace of an 
empire where Jews were a minority. The story of Moses and the Passover, told in the 
Old Testament as the “Exodus” from Pharaonic Egypt, before 1,200 B.C.E., is that of a 
Jewish rebellion under Moses, accompanied by the “killing of the first born” Egyptian 
sons in each household, with the sparing of Jewish households whose doorways were 
pre-marked in lamb’s blood. That of Hannukah is a fundamentalist revolt against the 
Selucid Greek monarchy of Syria in 165 B.C.E. Purim tells the story of how Jews living 
in Babylonia under a Persian King, Xerxes the Great, were spared from destruction in 
the late 4th century B.C.E. when a Jewish consort, “Ester,” and her uncle gained posi-
tion in the king’s court and turned him against Jews’ enemies. 
The clear contrast to these Jewish stories is that of Jesus, whom Christians have 
taken as their symbol of how minorities in an empire are supposed to behave, with direct 
Michael Blumenthal (Treasury), James Schlesinger (Energy), Neil Goldschmidt (Transportation), and Philip Klutznick 
(Commerce).
46. Abraham, the father of the Jews, is said to have been born in Ur, a Mesopotamian City that is now in Iraq. Though 
Jews left Iraq, they were brought back to Babylonia some 2,600 years ago until they were freed by the Persians under 
Cyrus the Great.
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implication for Jews. The historical figure of Jesus is a Jewish pacifist whose strategies 
of non-violent resistance against the Roman Empire marked the destruction of Israel 
and the 2,000 year Diaspora of the Jews. While the Passover rituals reinforce elements 
of law and fairness, as well as the recognition of the suffering of one’s enemies, Jewish 
traditions do not honor the strategies of those Jews who failed in standing up to empires.
The reinforcement of the traditions that Jews herald in opposing empire is the strug-
gle for retaking the land of Israel from the British and freeing it from colonial rule as an 
independent “Jewish” state. Not only was Israeli independence won through terrorist 
acts against the British and not only did the terrorists assume leadership positions in the 
new government (Menachim Begin and Yitzhak Shamir among them), but these acts 
also became a symbol for how to successfully wage an independence struggle against 
European powers. More than 50 years later, Vietnamese tell stories about how they 
modeled many of their terrorist actions against the French on Israeli tactics and how 
they saw Israeli independence as a model of achieving colonial liberation 47.
As the Cold War ended, the Islamic Revolution continued to be demonized in Amer-
ica and resources that had previously been under the influence of the Soviet Russian 
Empire now were seen as up for grabs. Both major political parties in the U.S. shifted to 
an agenda of U.S. control over the Middle East. The agenda was promoted by prominent 
Jews demonstrating their support for the U.S. Empire through their militarism against 
Islamic countries as well as their interests in stripping the declining Soviet Russian Em-
pire and Eastern Europe of whatever resources, intellectuals, and other assets could be 
taken. The ideals of “progress” in the U.S. almost entirely disappeared, to be replaced 
with agendas of globalization and control by the remaining super power.
I have made the case above, and in my earlier article more than a decade ago on 
why the prominent Jews in the Clinton Administration had underlying psychological 
reasons for selling out a progressive agenda and for supporting the stripping of the 
economies of the Eastern bloc, the deregulation and destruction of rule of law in the 
U.S. that led the U.S. economy to ruin, and the illegal use of U.S. power against Serbia. 
Because of the insecurity of Jews in the U.S. at the time, Jewish progressives agreed 
to these destructive policies and agreed to silence in order to protect their own. Jews in 
the establishment did not want to confront each other to deal directly with these fears or 
inconsistencies or to consider the consequences. That situation has continued.
What can be added to that story is the similar hypocrisy among progressives (and 
almost all lawyers) in confronting President Clinton over not only violations of inter-
national law and domestic law then and now, but his perjured testimony that became 
the subject of his impeachment. The best way to protect rule of law is to prosecute the 
guilty and go on with leaders who have cleaner records. While it is arguable whether or 
not Vice President Al Gore’s policies were different from those of President Clinton, he 
was not directly tied to criminal violations. Yet, most “progressives” opposed Clinton’s 
47. Personal communications to author during field work in Southeast Asia between 1998 and 2006.
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removal for impeachment or any subsequent prosecutions. The Clinton finances and 
actions were given a seal of approval as Hillary Clinton was approved for Secretary of 
State and now, again, at the time of this article, as she runs again for President. Although 
it is not polite to say or admit it, Jews have also tended to excuse Bill Clinton for his 
perjury over extra-marital affairs, and it is likely because one of his consorts, Monica 
Lewinsky, was a Jewish woman. I have noted above, how one of the most well-known 
stories that Jews recall each year on the Purim holiday is how a Jewish consort of the 
Persian King, Xerxes the Great, was the means to protecting Jewish interests in the 
Babylonian Empire. The story of “Queen Ester” is one that resonates in the tale of 
Monica Lewinsky, because a President’s passion for a Jewish woman suggests that he 
will also be a protector of other Jews (more recently, the Clintons’ daughter, Chelsea, 
married a Jewish man).
The combination of the events of the “stolen” Presidential election of 2000 and 
of the “terrorist attacks” of September 11, 2001, has now achieved mythical status in 
U.S. political history. The myth that is told by the elites of the Democratic Party, that 
apparently won the election but lost in the courts (or decided for reasons that have not 
been made fully clear to give up its legal challenges) and the media, is that the two 
Presidential candidates would have been radically different. In fact, Al Gore’s Vice 
Presidential nominee, Joe Lieberman, the first Jewish candidate for Vice President of 
a major Party, was a strong advocate for the wars and curtailing of civil liberties of 
the Bush Administration. Democrats in the Congress overwhelmingly supported every 
Bush administration request for funds, for new legal authority, for approval of Cabinet 
appointments, and for the economic policies that widened deficits and led to (or sub-
sidized) the financial crisis and questionable public spending choices. Arguments that 
Gore would have withstood these pressures do not stand up, given his unwillingness to 
engage in a lengthy process challenging the election results. The only real differences 
attributed to Gore was his interest in the environment, but this was not manifest in any 
pledges by Gore or by his party to disengage the U.S. military from activities in the 
Middle East or Central Asia to gain control over non-renewable resources for contin-
ued burning of fossil fuels. Nor was the idea of “pre-emptive” warfare or violation of 
international law something new to the Bush Administration. By bombing Serbia, the 
Clinton Administration promoted a policy for unilateral action in pre-emptive war that 
Clinton’s Vice President, Gore, did not disavow. Most statements about the Clinton 
Administration on their approach to “terrorism” continue to be a battle over who was 
tougher over Muslim political movements.
If the story of 2000 and 2001 is retold from the perspective of Jews’ deepest fears 
and why Jewish political progressives would give up their agenda, for protection, it is 
this. What was really lost in the 2000 election was the chance for the “first Jewish Vice 
President” (Joe Lieberman) as a symbol that U.S. military power would protect Jews. 
What was “lost” in that election was not a policy agenda, but the incorporation of more 
Jews in prominent places, managing that power.
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With both of the major political parties in the U.S. committed to what they call the 
“global war on terror” and on anyone who can be linked to “supporting” terror, with 
the U.S. considering itself above and not bound by international law and free to strike 
any country or jail or spy on any political group at will, any “non-Christian” group 
and any group that supports independence movements could then and can today eas-
ily become a potential target. There is no reason to think that Jews would be immune. 
Given Jewish holidays and Jewish and Israeli history as a Middle Eastern origin people 
supporting anti-colonial struggles and “terrorist” tactics, and given that Muslims share 
some of this history in the Koran, Jews are also a potential target of the unchecked 
super power looking to the “source” of terrorist and liberation struggles. The picture of 
Osama bin Laden planning a religious fundamentalist movement in desert caves is quite 
easy to link to pictures of Moses in Jewish stories of Passover and to the legend of the 
“Prophet Elijah” and the religious slaughter of Baal priests who challenged the Jewish 
faith. There are similar echoes in the Hannukah stories and the guerilla warfare of the 
Maccabee religious faithful.
There has been a remarkable parallel change in the way Jews now retell their own 
history and in the way they act in politics. Both seem to have roots in the fear of U.S. 
and Western military power against anyone now labeled as in support of “terrorism.” 
Every year on the Passover holiday, Jews retell the story of the liberation struggle led by 
Jewish slaves in Egypt against the Egyptians. During the 1960s and 1970s, Jewish pro-
gressive households told the story of the “Passover” of Jewish houses and the death of 
the first born in the Egyptian households as one of a planned action by Jewish activists 
to conduct night raids against the Egyptians while the Egyptians slept. The story was 
that such killing was only the last resort after every other option had been exhausted, 
but that it was an action justified in the cause of religious and minority freedoms when 
nothing else worked. It was told with the spilling of wine as both a symbol of blood and 
of shared sorrow. In short, this was a story about how and when terrorist action was to 
be justified in the cause of a liberation struggle. Now, more than 30 years later, mention 
of that earlier story is met with almost a fanatical response that the killings were not 
done by Jews, that there was no terrorism, that this was only an “act of God” and that 
no other interpretation or story was possible. The idea of the spilling of wine as shared 
sorrow over difficult and complex human actions has also disappeared. The idea of the 
Passover service as a place for questioning and discussion has also largely been replaced 
with a single telling 48.
Similarly, oral stories about the founding of Israel – heralding the terrorist activi-
ties of the Irgun and the Stern gang – now seem cleansed of any parallels to actions by 
other religious or nationalist groups elsewhere on the globe; destroying any sense of 
commonality and compassion for struggles against empire.
48. This is my experience in some 40 years of attending Passover seders with family and with members of the Jewish 
community working in social services fields in the university and overseas.
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Although the more typical telling of this story is that Jews fear that the U.S. might 
“abandon” Israel to militant Islam, the reality is that politically progressive Jews have 
no reason to be opposed to the struggles of Islamic peoples for their own identity and 
autonomy or for greater equity. Nor should they have any reason to oppose Osama bin 
Laden’s statements calling for more democracy in Saudi Arabia or other Arab military 
powers or for autonomy for areas of Afghanistan from Russian or American or other 
military interests. Jews may be in opposition to religious tyranny, but should not be op-
posed to some of the other goals.
All small countries in the world today fear of abuse of military power and political 
intervention from larger countries, including the U.S., particularly given the lack of 
enforcement of international laws against the major powers. No country wants to be put 
on a list of terror states and to face pre-emptive war or economic embargoes or other 
interference. Israel is no exception. But, fortunately, for Israel, it has little in the way of 
attractive resources to major imperial powers like the U.S. Its only exploitable resource 
that is of interest to non-Jews, other than its ability to carry out U.S. military interests 
and conduct arms sales, is its list of Christian cultural heritage sites 49 and there is no 
reason to think that any Israeli governing party would make them unavailable.
The real fear of Jews and particularly of political progressives in the U.S. is how 
police and national security state powers will be used in the U.S. against Jews, given the 
real and visible fear about how military and police powers are used in the U.S. against 
Muslims, Blacks and other minorities. There is little fear of this power being used 
against Israel 50. While many Jews were already supporting U.S. elites in demonizing 
Islamic political movements, the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, 
the city where there are more Jews in the world than Jerusalem and where many of 
the dead were Jews 51, helped to cement the alliance between Jews and U.S. Christians 
against Muslim political aspirations.
From this perspective, the voting behavior in recent elections becomes clearer as 
does the real motivation of voters. The idea that there were significant differences on 
issues between the major parties, that the choice between the two of them was signifi-
cant and that progressives needed to join the Democratic Party against Republican can-
didate John McCain in 2008 for these reasons is easy to expose as fraudulent. Senator, 
now Vice President Joe Biden, actively sought to put the 2008 Republican Presidential 
candidate, on the 2004 Democratic Party ticket with Senator Kerry, and said in early 
2005 that he would be equally happy to run with McCain on the same Party ticket as 
49. Samuel Clemens/ Mark Twain documents visiting them with U.S. tourists back in the 19th century. See Twain, 
1869. 
50. One well known Jewish author who has recently expressed such sensitivities in book and interviews is Naomi 
Wolf, who traces her hyper-sensitivity to this issue and her confrontation of it to her father’s loss of family members in 
the Holocaust. Wolf, 2007.
51. Some 20 to 25% of Jews in the U.S. live in New York city and its suburbs. Sources posted on Wikipedia suggest 
that Jewish deaths were consistent their actual percentage in the New York population (9%) or higher (up to 15% of the 
deaths). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11_conspiracy_theories#cite_ref-163
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he would against him 52. The 2000 Democratic Vice Presidential candidate, Joe Lieber-
man, endorsed McCain. Yet, Lieberman was also the very Senator whom Barack Obama 
supported in his Senate race and to whom he turned for mentoring 53. If all of these 
candidates were in bed with each other and perpetrating a charade about differences on 
issues, what was the real sensitivity that heightened passions? Why such apparent hatred 
or hysteria towards the progressive candidates rather than attempts either to support 
them or reach out to them?
The resentment of Ralph Nader in the 2000 Presidential vote can be described in 
ethnic terms. Muslims voted in high numbers for Nader to protect their civil liberties 
but Jews and Blacks sought to distance themselves as far as possible from a Lebanese 
American. The hatred against Nader was not that he “caused” any of the regressive poli-
cies that both parties supported in their administrations and in Congress. It is much more 
likely that Nader is perceived to have mobilized Muslim voters and Jewish and other 
progressives against the “First Jewish Vice President, Joe Lieberman,” then against the 
“First Partially Jewish Democratic Party President, John Kerry,” and finally against the 
“First Partially African Male President, Barack Obama.”
In many ways, the Jewish (and Black) bashing of Ralph Nader, who actually rep-
resented the core values that most American Jews held in the 1940s through the 1960s, 
was a racist bashing against an “Arab” who supported the Palestinians, and a clannish 
defensiveness in order to assure that a member of the Jewish tribe was in charge of the 
expanding military, police, and financial reward apparatus. The targeting of fear and 
attack has been switched to Muslims and others of Middle Eastern descent in hopes of 
drawing attention away from Jews. 
The conundrum facing progressives is that this new order puts them in a position 
where they are perceived as “traitors” to their own ethnic group if they oppose the 
Democratic Party and its choice of Establishment Blacks, Jews and women. This is 
the simple answer to Klein’s question of why economists such as Summers, Rubin and 
Greenspan are not now held to account by progressives. It is the same answer to why 
former Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger, Elliot Abrams, 
Madelyn Albright, and Richard Holbrooke are not held to standards of international 
justice. There is a similar answer for Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza 
Rice, and currently for Barack Obama. Once minorities rise in the system, progressive 
minorities are caught in the double bind where criticizing those of their own group is 
seen as a support for “racism” and a threat to their own security. To protect their own 
perceived interests, they turn silent. For Jews, that very silence is corrosive of cultural 
beliefs and a direct threat to identity. For Jews whose political identity – the sense of 
52. The Kerry and McCain campaigns discussed the idea with each other. http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jVQEaUZDjiU, The Biden comments on the 2008 ticket and his confirmation that he urged McCain to run 
with Kerry in 2004 were on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart, August 2, 2005. http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/
index.jhtml?videoId=125441&title=Joe-Biden-Pt,-2 
53. Stephanie Reitz, 2006.
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what distinguishes Jews from others in the modern world – is based on the ability to 
tell truth to power, to stand up to authority and to take direct responsibility and action 
against a government or power that causes harm or death to other minorities, the silence 
in the face of oppression or death to others (Iraqi, Pakistani, Afghan, or Palestinian 
citizens and children whose only “crime” is their ethnic identity but not their actions) 
makes Jews who uphold their progressive traditions the very people they condemn 54.
The silence of most Jews about policies of Israel or about the excesses of Wall Street 
and their unwillingness to place the blame on those visible Jews who promoted these 
policies along with the elites behind them, is part of the current identity politics. The 
goal is to suppress certain racist attacks not only from government and from angry mobs 
of ordinary citizens.
Although there are a number of Jews in the media who could dissect these issues 55, 
there is little discussion of what it means to be Jewish and progressive, what the fears 
are, and what it would mean to maintain identity and be consistent. The fact that the 
Klein interview does not reach this level of analysis suggests that it is either taboo 
throughout the culture or is so deep in the subconscious that it is hard to express.
Jewish progressive candidates for President, such as Green Party candidate Dr. Jill 
Stein in 2012 and now Bernie Sanders, have also sought to avoid mention of their 
ethnicity and Jewish values. Senator Sanders’ early campaign commercials in 2015 de-
scribed himself as the son of “Polish immigrants”, not Jewish, and he often mentioned 
his agreement on issues with the Pope.
54. If “Nazis” are those German citizens who remained silent when their governments began to round up Jews and 
who were afraid to speak out and to help Jews or stop the killing, when the risks to them were minimal, what makes 
Jews any different today when the risks are also minimal but they agree to fund the deaths and remain silent supporters 
of those political figures who enable or cause those deaths?
55. Major media interviewers in the U.S. who are Jewish – Larry King, Wolf Blitzer, Mike Wallace, Ted Koppel, and 
major outlets with Jewish ownership, including the New York Times -- have shied away from this kind of introspection 
and long-term perspective on Jewish interests or the nature of progress.
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3.6. How the “Jewish Question” Becomes a Survival Question as the U.S. 
Empire Collapses and as Oil Runs Out: The Consequences of the Choice 
Jewish Progressives are Making: An Ongoing Test of the Theories
While the “short term” strategy that Jews and Jewish progressives seem to have 
chosen in the U.S. – one of ethnic representation and distancing from targeted groups, 
along with a silencing of the progressive agenda and support of elite interests in return 
for protection – may be perceived as necessary or prudent, there are strong reasons to 
think that it could also be a dangerous choice. The lessons of 20th century history sug-
gest that Jewish support for elites easily turns into a deadly strategy when empires fall 
and economies collapse. There are now ample warning signs in the U.S. and in Western 
Europe to suggest that silence and support for systems that now seem to be collapsing 
not only will not open the door for progress, but it will lead to Jews becoming the like-
liest targets and victims when failures occur. Political representation in high positions 
does not offer protection when the system fails, as French Jews under the moderate left 
Jewish Prime Minister Leon Blum learned in 1942, to public chants of “Mieux Hitler 
que Blum” (“Better Hitler than Blum”).
In earlier works, I have sought to model the economics and demographics of politi-
cal violence and the implications for different minority groups. While there is still no 
specific model when violence occurs against different groups, there are some key vari-
ables to look for such as litmus tests and comparisons.
In the table, below, I have sought to reconstruct some of the economic, social strata, 
and demographic conditions that existed for Jews in two failed empires in Europe in the 
20th century where anti-Semitic (anti-Jewish) laws and violence developed partly inde-
pendently; Germany and Austro-Hungary. Alongside the factors for those two countries, 
I have placed the contemporary U.S. Although I do not include the Russian empire here, 
in other work I have compared conditions of anti-Semitism that arose in the Soviet Rus-
sian Empire and in the U.S. post-World War ii. I describe the impact of economic hard-
ship in Soviet Russia in the 1930s as a different phenomenon from the collapse of an 
empire and note that, when the Soviet Russian Empire collapsed in 1990, Jews largely 
migrated and escaped mass violence. Russia is also a different case because its social 
system and distribution of wealth did not match the European model.
What the chart demonstrates is that Jews have achieved roughly the same position 
now in the United States that they had in Europe before the Holocaust. They are also 
visible in much the same way in the financial sector and in alliance with elites. Jews 
in the U.S. have entered the same fields as they did in pre-Holocaust Europe – law, 
medicine, banking, journalism and publishing, entertainment. The only thing that is 
different is that they have achieved greater representation in formal political institutions 
in the U.S. than in pre-Holocaust Europe, as described earlier in the article, although it 
could be argued that in Eastern Europe they expressed political influence in different 
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ways (through overrepresentation in the publishing industry and media, including half 
of Budapest’s journalists).
Table 7. Comparative Economic and Political Position of Jews
Category of Comparison Germany, 1920 Hungary, 1920 Contemporary U.S.
Jews as a Percentage of Population 1% 5% 2-3%
Percent of Wealth Held by Jews 
(estimated)
4%10 20-25%11 5-29%12
Percent of Banking-Commercial 
Leadership (urban centers) that is 
Jewish13
13-25%14 50%15 50%16
Percent of Legal Positions (urban centers) 
Held by Jews17
27%18 50%19 20-32.5%20
Positions in Legislature Held by Jews 2.2%21 1%22 10%23
10. This is the percentage of income tax that Jews paid in Germany during the Weimar era and can 
be used as a rough approximation of wealth. From Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the “Jewish 
Question,” Princeton University Press, 1984, page 15. Another source notes that Jewish “average 
income” was 3.2 times that of the national population in 1931. Donald I. Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar 
Germany, Transaction Publishers, 2001, page 16, on the web at: http://books.google.com/books?id=wtU
0PDLU2s0C&pg=PA32&lpg=PA32&dq
11. From the main exhibit at the Holocaust Memorial Museum, 49 Pava utca, Budapest, Hungary, on 
display in the fall of 2008..
12. No specific figures are available for wealth ownership of Jews. Some breakdowns of U.S. census 
data make distinctions by “race” but in the U.S., Jews are not defined as a racial group. I have derived 
this data rage through calculations based on existing data for wealth ownership in the U.S. 
a) To calculate the lower limit: The percentage of Jewish households with income greater than $50,000 
is double that of non-Jews. Additionally, the percentage of Jewish households with income less than 
$20,000 is half that of non-Jews. Steven Silbiger, The Phenomenon of the Jews: Seven Keys to the 
Enduring Wealth of a People 2000. Similar data shows that 35% of Jews earn more than $100,000 
compared to 19% of all American households. Avishai, supra, page 10. This would suggest that Jewish 
wealth is at least double their percent of the population and suggests a lower bound of 5%. 
b) To calculate the upper limit: Start with the assumption that there are Jews concentrated in the upper 
1% of all wealth holders and that they make up half of this wealthy elite. That would be 0.5% of the 
population and one fifth of all Jews potentially in that category, with the rest of the country’s Jews (2.0% 
of the population) elsewhere. If that 2% were concentrated among the rest of the top 5% of wealth 
holders, Jews at MOST, could hold half of that. In 1998 and continuing to 2004 the top 5% owned 59% 
of wealth; top 1% owned 38%. This works out to an upper limit of 29%. From: The Economic Policy 
Institute: The State of Working America, 2008/2009, http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/tabfig.html
13. Note the distinction here between owners and managers. This is a generalized aggregate statistic 
of industrialists, stock markets, and banks (those with major capital control) in an attempt to draw a 
meaningful comparison.
14. Jews controlled 18-23% of Germany’s banks and held roughly 15% of the positions in the major 
banks – 43% of the jobs in Jewish banks and 5.8% in the rest) and 6.23% of positions in banking and the 
stock market nationally, but 80% in Berlin. They held 13% of the directorships of joint stock corporations 
and 25% of the management positions. Jews ran 25% of the country’s retail and wholesale trade. 
Gordon, supra, pages 11-12.
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15. Various sources on Budapest, where wealth and industry were concentrated, note that Jews 
(and second generation Jewish families that had converted their religion) accounted for half of the 
industrialists, ran the stock market, and were major players in the banking industry, owning several 
major firms. Kinga Frojimovics,; Geza Komoroczy, Viktoria Puszati and Andrea Strbik, Jewish Budapest: 
Monuments, Rites, History, Central European University Press: Budapest Another reference, describes 
Jews as holding 53% of all “commercial executive” positions nationally and 64% of those in Budapest. 
Peter Tibor Nagy, “The Numerous, 1994.Clausus in Inter-War Hungary: Pioneering European 
Antisemitism,” East European Jewish Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1, June 2005, available on the web at the 
World Hungarian Jewish Observer site: http://www.whjo.org/numerus.htm
16. Joseph Aaron, “Feel the Power,” commenting on The New Establishment, the 100 most powerful, 
most influential people in American society, Vanity Fair, October 2007: http://www.jewishworldreview.
com/joe/aaron101007.php3 at least 51 are Jews, up from 30 in the 1970s
17. The legal profession is not entirely the same in all countries so this is only a rough comparison. 
However, in all countries it is a profession requiring university education. In all three countries (unlike 
the Soviet Union), lawyers played an important role in management of wealth and investment. Note 
that statistics for Jews in the medical profession generally also track those for lawyers. Jews play a 
disproportionate role in both the body of the country and in individual body health.
18. The statistic is from 1904 but would be consistent into the 1930s since the percentage of Jewish 
students studying law was 25% between 1918 and 1933. From Gordon, supra., page 13. However, 
Niewyk suggests that lawyers were only “more than 16%” of the total in 1933, in his book, supra, page 
15. (Note that the figure he offers for doctors is 11%.)
19. Various sources on Budapest note that lawyers were half of the profession, where the country’s 
lawyers were concentrated. Frojimovics, Komoroczy, et. al., supra. Another reference, that may be 
national, puts this figure at 45%. Nagy, supra. In a more recent work, Yuri Slezkine, puts the number 
at 51% (with 60% of doctors in the country of Jewish origin). The Jewish Century, Princeton University 
Press, 2005.
20. The 20% figure is a national statistic from the 1960s when the number of lawyers nationally was 
350,000. 10 Ency. Judaica Lawyers 1490, 1505 (Macmillan Co. 1971). The 32.5% figure is for Chicago 
in the early 1980s and represents the rough sample (that may not be fully representative) used by Heinz 
and Laumann in their survey of Chicago lawyers. John P. Heinz and Edward O. Laumann, Chicago 
Lawyer: The Social Structure of the Bar (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1982). The National 
Association for Law Placement suggests that the percentage of Jewish lawyers has dropped overall, 
but part of this may be due to the fact that the legal profession is changing and growing. The national 
figure should now be falling by about half due to changes in the profession (to roughly 10% nationwide) 
but the percentage of Jews in leadership positions across the profession should be the same. Note that 
the number of lawyers in the country has tripled since the 1960s (recently reported by the American Bar 
Association as 1, 143, 358 in 2007), even though the population has only increased by 55% in that span 
of time. American Bar Association, National Lawyer Population by State, 2007, on the web at: http://www.
abanet.org/marketresearch/2007_Natl_Lawyer_FINALonepage.pdf
21. Percentage of delegates to the Reichstag from 1867 to 1916. From Gordon, supra, page 18.
22. In the 1926 National Assembly, there were 3 Jewish deputies among the 245 total seats. Raphael 
Patai, The Jews of Hungary: History, Culture, Psychology, Wayne State Press, Detroit, 1966, page 435.
23. The 221th Congress, elected in November 2008, had 13 Jewish Senators and 32 Members of the 
House of Representatives; 13% of the Senate and 8% of the House. This is up from 30 House Members.
The data from the table can be displayed in ratios to account for the slightly differ-
ent percentages of Jews in the three different societies. Note how consistent the ratios 
of disproportionality are across the three countries, in three of the four categories (all 
except for political representation).
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Table 8. Comparative Economic and Political Position of Jews: Disproportionality Comparisons
Category of Comparison Index of 
Disproportionality for 
Germany and Hungary
Index of 
Disproportionality for 
Contemporary U.S.
Percent of Wealth Held by Jews (estimated) 4 to 5 2 to 10
Percent of Banking-Commercial Leadership 
(urban centers) that is Jewish
10 to 25 20
Percent of Legal Positions (urban centers) Held 
by Jews
10 to 25 10 to 12
Positions in Legislature Held by Jews 0.2 to 2 4
The tables suggest that the Jews have roughly the same visibility and opportunity 
to be targeted in the U.S. today as they did in both Nazi Germany and fascist Hungary. 
There are some differences in the fact that there is no large rural population in the U.S. 
today that would perceive itself as cut off from urban culture and decisions made in 
the cities by Jews and other minorities who were essentially the majority populations 
in Eastern European cities in the early 20th century, though there are large numbers of 
people who see themselves as outside major power centers of Washington, New York, 
and other major cities where there are large numbers of Jews. In Germany and Hungary, 
Jews were concentrated in cities and were mostly traders and professionals, and it is 
hard to say that Jews are any less visible in the U.S. today than they were in places such 
as Berlin or Budapest where they had also largely assimilated 56. There may not be a 
large rural population in the U.S., but the division of U.S. politics into “Red” (formerly 
rural, mostly Southern, often “Bible belt” and non-Jewish) states and “Blue” states with 
high concentrations of Jews in major cities, is equally visible.
In order to project the likelihood of a Holocaust occurring in the United States, it 
would be necessary to predict the economic dislocations and type of competition for 
jobs, capital and basic commodities that are likely to occur and to compare these with 
the types of insecurities and competitions that occurred in Germany and Hungary after 
World War i. Certainly other empires fell in recent memory (including the British Em-
pire) without an internal genocide in its center. Genocide models are incomplete due to 
cushioning effects and outside support. As this article is written and the U.S. enters a 
period of economic decline, there are simply too many competing models and predic-
56. 55% of Germany’s Jews were urban compared to 25% of all Germans, and almost one third lived in Berlin. Gor-
don, supra. Half of Jews worked in commerce and only 1-2% in agriculture in Germany compared to 29% of Germans. 
This didn’t mean that rural Jews weren’t visible targets as they were for the Ukrainian hetman nationalists, but that they 
were identifiable in 20th century discrimination, much as they could be in the U.S. Encyclopedia Judaica, Second edi-
tion, Volume 7, Germany.
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tions as to whether the U.S. Empire will suffer a sharp collapse or a slow decline, or 
whether other shocks will contribute to a long depression 57. 
Nevertheless, if it can be assumed that the economic conditions that existed before 
the genocides in Europe are to reappear in the U.S., there is good reason to suspect that 
Jews will be targeted in much the same way as they were in 20th century Europe. When 
jobs and resources become scarce and there is competition for them, the violence will 
likely be channeled and targeted to particular culture groups. Those who are likely to be 
the victims are those groups who are seen to have unequal shares, who are in the social 
positions to have taken and protected wealth, whose actions can be linked in some way 
with the crisis and suffering that has occurred, and who represent a population that is 
small enough and identifiable enough to be targeted in a way that directs attention and 
responsibility away from both the majority and from the elites who belong to the major-
ity ethnicity. All of those conditions are being created now in the U.S. and Jews have 
created these conditions. The “handwriting” is not visible “on the wall” but it is visible 
in many anonymous comments on the Internet.
While Jews are only a small minority that is not responsible for the failures of elite 
or majority rule in the U.S. and that has shifted views in order to accommodate the 
elites, that is not how the story is likely to be told in conditions of economic collapse. 
Elites will look for a small and more visible group onto whom they can shift the blame. 
By their political visibility now in the U.S. government and in major institutions, Jews 
are now even more likely to be targeted.
As of the writing of this piece, as the U.S. economy and U.S. Empire begin to fail, 
two groups have already been imprinted on public consciousness linked with two key 
causes of economic loss (and loss of life to U.S. citizens): 1) Muslim fundamentalists 
causing deaths and triggering huge military spending in the “War on Terrorism,” for 
reasons that are increasingly linked to Jews and 2) failure and abuses of global financial 
institutions, including Wall Street and Jewish run firms, triggering the global “Financial 
Crisis.” Jews are placed prominently in the causal chain of threats and expense to most 
Americans. Regardless of the actual causes of these economic difficulties, these two 
concerns (along with several others such as climate change and oil price rises) are seen 
or presented by the media as the most costly and the most easily targeted to a specific 
57. Among the different predictions that appear to the author to be most empirically grounded in theories of 
comparative empires and of materialist realities of complex economic systems are: Kunstler, 2004; Johnson, 2007 and 
Bacevich, 2008, among others. Now in Obama’s second term, the choices that were envisioned by President Obama and 
the earlier Democratic Congress did not suggest any real long term solutions of the underlying problems that caused the 
financial crisis and that many analysts believe are likely to lead to other crises. Spending packages to “stimulate” the 
economy that were based on tax cuts rather than real scientific and intellectual (non-military) productive investment and 
legal infrastructure beyond energy “efficiency,” the huge military expenses, lack of economic transfers to the poor, and 
the postponement of resolution of future crisis that will attract resources (continuing climatic and resource wars) do not 
suggest that there will be a future balance of population, consumption and resources, or more equitable or negotiated 
ways of resolving conflicts that would avoid violent competition. Increases in the U.S. debt also suggest the potential 
for the same kind of hyperinflation that occurred in Germany in the early 20th century.
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group. It is easy to see why Jews are likely to be targeted by examining both of these 
areas.
1) The “War on Terrorism” – When U.S. citizens look for trails of where trillions of 
dollars have been spent with little perceived benefit in a time of economic hardship, the 
“War on Terrorism” looms as one of the largest in terms of spending and also includes 
preventable deaths. Economist Joseph Stiglitz estimated the cost merely of the U.S. 
invasion and occupation of Iraq between 2002 and 2008, at $4 trillion 58. By 2009, the 
U.S. was spending nearly $1 trillion per year -- more than 6% of its Gross Domestic 
Product and about half of all discretionary government expenditure – on military costs 
with little translatable economic benefit for citizens and hundreds of annual deaths and 
casualties. The $3,000 per person per year is much more than the average annual food 
budget for Americans and a hungry person could easily draw the parallel 59.
Although the U.S. has long supported military spending for international invasions 
in order to secure resources and markets, these recent wars appear to have been under-
taken to secure a diminishing global resource while deterring investments in renewable 
resources. As this spending and the international backlash that it has caused the U.S. are 
evaluated in the future, the spending and the oil policy underlying it (and contribution 
to additional costs of climate change) are likely to be seen as irrational and motivated 
by benefits to a small group rather than to the overall national interest. Even though the 
largest beneficiaries in terms of short term gains are oil companies, military contractors, 
automobile and other petroleum based industries, they will seek to avoid blame.
A more convenient story is one that is already written; that wars in the Middle East 
and in Central Asia were to stop “Muslim extremism” and “terror” and to defend “Is-
raeli interests.” The people who are already making this link are Muslims who see the 
policy being supported by Israel, as a satellite of the U.S. not only acting as its agent 
but pursuing similar policies in gaining access to water resources and territory in the 
areas around Israel. American elites do not have to draw attention to Jews as a scapegoat 
because groups that have been harmed are already doing this for them.
The names in the U.S. who will be easy to blame for these policies include a few 
elite families like “Bush” but there is a long list of the people behind them who have 
promoted this military spending: the neo-conservatives who are largely Jews, U.S. State 
Department officials from Kissinger to Elliot Abrams; U.S. Senators like Joe Lieber-
man; and military officials like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. The message that 
the U.S. is a target of Islamic terrorism because of its support for Israeli violations of 
international law in the Palestinian territories is already one that is widespread. When 
U.S. citizens look to the causes of “terrorism”, their attention is directed first to Mus-
58. Herszenhorn, 2008. 
59. The average food spending per person in the U.S. in urban areas in 2004 was $2,207. If non-urban areas were 
included, the average would be even lower. U.S. Department of Agriculture data, reported in “US food spending report 
uncovers trends and tastes,” March 16, 2007, on the web at: http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Financial-Industry/
US-food-spending-report-uncovers-trends-and-tastes
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lims, but it is linked immediately to Jews who seem to also be part of the cause of why 
Muslims have turned to terrorist tactics.
In short, even as the crisis worsens, the U.S. and Israel have remained committed 
to continued spending to perpetuate militaristic approaches to control over resources, 
despite the cost. Without clear economic benefits and increasing costs, the funds for 
these expenditures will disappear and the people who caused the problem will likely 
find themselves as targets. The peoples of the Middle East are going to remember what 
the U.S. has done and the U.S. will have fewer resources to protect itself. In a declin-
ing U.S., hungry and angry people are already asserting that it was Jews who played a 
major role in these policies of war spending and death that the country will be paying 
off for generations. 
In Hungary after World War i, there were attempts to blame Jews for not being 
strong enough supporters of the war effort and a cause for losses. This was an echo of 
Eastern European attacks against Jews in driving out the Turks and anyone who seemed 
close to them. If the U.S. Empire collapses, Jews will not be blamed for “defeat” but for 
politicizing the use of military force and for bankrupting the economy through military 
spending for their perceived interests.
2) The “Financial Crisis” – The standard attack on Jews in Germany and Hun-
gary after World War i was that Jews ran the banking system and the legal system and 
not only should have foreseen economic decline but profited from it and the harms it 
caused. That argument is now part of the common wisdom in describing the causes of 
the financial crisis that began in 2008 60. While blame could easily be directed in the 
past to “corporate interests” and to “Wall Street” and “Big Business,” which conjures 
up images of aristocratic families and White, Protestant names and firms, that picture 
seem to have changed. As with the U.S. State Department and military where many of 
the appointed heads of both major parties have Jewish names, that is now equally true of 
the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and other financial positions such as the 
Commerce Department. That is also why Klein partly bites her tongue when it comes 
to the “J” word (“Jewish”) when she asks why progressives do not want to squarely put 
blame for the failings on people such as Larry Summers and Robert Rubin and Alan 
Greenspan.
Most of the people who benefited from the excesses of Wall Street and the ideology 
of globalism, were not Jews; nor were the majority of those who supported the billion 
dollar bailouts starting in 2008 to try to solve (or temporarily cover up) the underlying 
problem. Today, however, “Wall Street” has a very different connotation because of the 
60. My own work began to document predictions of collapse in parallels to the Soviet Union in 1992, with similar 
pieces written during the early 1980s including critiques of the ideology that I found at Stanford in the law and business 
schools in the 1980s that I published in several places. There is long and clear documentation that political and financial 
elites knew that deregulation and destruction of the country’s legal oversight and educational and civic infrastructure 
would lead to economic collapse. Media and film long documented the “Greed is Good” view that became the gospel in 
the Reagan years. Progress and the future became irrelevant as did the idea of the “public interest.”
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names now associated with it. When the financial crisis broke, the Bush Administra-
tion official who seemed caught unawares, Henry Paulson, was immediately associated 
with his investment bank where he personally accumulated a fortune. It was “Goldman 
Sachs,” the same firm of Robert Rubin and the firm that was described as the largest 
contributor to the Obama Presidential campaign. Immediately after this scandal, the 
largest private investment firm scandal that was reported was that of Bernard Madoff, a 
Jewish financier on Wall Street who became the magnet for Jewish investors seeking to 
beat the system. In the public mind, Wall Street, in New York, is now increasingly seen 
as the symbol of Jewish activity in the city where Jews have the highest population. It 
is the Berlin or Budapest of U.S. finance and empire.
In global finance, the image of Jewish responsibility is also easily reinforced. Presid-
ing over the globalization and structural adjustment strategies of the World Bank were 
also Jews like Wolfenson, then Wolfowitz, and Stiglitz who exposed how that system 
was actually creating indebtedness rather than sustainability of most of the borrowing 
countries 61. Obama’s current Secretary of Commerce and one of the major financial 
supporters of his campaigns, from Chicago, is Penny Pritzger, a representative of one 
of the wealthiest Jewish families in the country.
When Americans and others around the globe search for those to blame for the 
market fundamentalism that has also been tied to personal corruption and fortunes of 
the very government officials who promoted them, they see a merry-go-round of the 
same names going back and forth between the firms that they were to de-regulate or 
from which they draw financial favors, into and out of government. The major names 
described as the “brilliant minds” and “brains” behind these schemes, like Summers and 
those above, and Jeff Sachs and others, are Jews.
What makes these signs particularly ominous for Jews is that even while the col-
lapse is occurring, Jewish progressives and others who are perfectly aware of the causes 
or who were part of the problem, have been behind a new U.S. Presidential administra-
tion and a Congress with most of the same names, with the same financial interests (like 
Goldman Sachs, along with other major Jewish donors) and endorsements of policies 
that only treat the symptoms but that continue the problem. What that means is that 
the very people who are going to be seen presiding over this collapse, if it does reach 
significant proportions, are the same people who supported its creation. That includes a 
significant number of Jewish faces and also some Blacks, like Obama.
The very fear that underlies the impulse of progressive Jews to have distanced them-
selves from Muslims and to have joined the elites is itself the recognition that Jews in 
the U.S. will not be safe if the system collapses. What Jews who whistle in the grave-
yard will pretend is that the circumstances in the U.S. are much more different from 
those in Germany and Hungary in the 20th century and that this will make it difficult to 
target Jews. They will suggest that there are other minorities who are vulnerable given 
61. Stiglitz, 2002.
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that the U.S. is a cosmopolitan society and that this includes Blacks, Latinos, Asians, 
Native Americans and other identifiable minorities in the pentagon of colors and preju-
dices within the U.S. (white, off white/ Middle Eastern, yellow, brown, black, and red). 
They will claim that there is more intermarriage in the U.S. among Jews and other races 
than there was in Eastern Europe and in Germany. They will also rest their hope on a 
belief that there is no clear agrarian majority that would target Jews. Almost certainly, 
Muslims would continue to be a target as would Blacks and Asians in much the way 
that they have always been in the U.S. and in the way that the Roma/Gypsy were also 
targeted in the Holocaust.
In fact, there are several factors that make the Jews particularly vulnerable in the 
U.S. and in Western Europe, as well, that are different from other minorities and that 
reflect the commonality of conditions with those in pre-Holocaust Europe. One is that 
they are already more likely to be scapegoats for the reasons described above. While 
Blacks could be blamed for the failures of an Obama administration, Blacks have only 
recently had the history of State Department and military positions that Jews have now 
held for more than a generation. Moreover, they do not have visibility in the financial 
sector or any historic association with New York and Wall Street. Second, Blacks and 
Hispanics are much too large a population and they are also not perceived to have 
concentrated wealth and position and influence in the same way that Jews have. Third, 
Jews remain geographically identifiable and professionally identifiable in the U.S. They 
are concentrated in certain cities and areas where their economic holdings represent 
something that can create jealousy and anger. As in pre-Holocaust Europe, they are in 
cities and they are on the coasts in what Americans call the “blue states” of the U.S. The 
southern and mid-western States are not agrarian, but they do represent a more agrarian 
culture as well as a strong Christian culture. It is one that Jews, themselves, recognize 
as anti-Semitic.
It is the “fault line” or dividing line between “Christians” and “non-Christians” 
(Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Confucians) – European Americans and those they mis-
sionized and assimilated, versus Middle Easterners and Asians on the other side – that 
is still a likely logic of discrimination and separation. It is ironic that Muslims and Jews 
are the easy targets and also potential allies against discrimination, while they are now 
among the furthest apart.
What also makes Jews particularly vulnerable in the U.S. is that they lack the same 
kind of international protectors that other countries have. Israel is known to have nu-
clear weapons, but where would it use them to retaliate against genocide in the U.S. if 
the country were still around to respond? New York? It is in the major urban centers 
where Jews are concentrated. By contrast, Asians and Latin Americans have a deterrent 
by their size and power. When the U.S. first experimented with concentration camps for 
the Japanese population in World War ii, the Japanese were already at war with the U.S.
The only compelling argument is that Jews would be difficult to round up (or forced 
to give up their jobs, then to emigrate and leave their property behind) and to concen-
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trate given not only intermarriage but the fact that this creates a much larger group 
of people with kinship ties who also have to be dealt with in some way. In fact, the 
administrative difficulty of dealing with groups like this slowed the concentration of 
German Jews as well as Hungarian Jews in Budapest under German occupation. But 
the numbers were not very different. By the 1930’s, some 15 to 44% of children born 
to Jews were in mixed marriages in Germany, similar to the 50% rate of intermarriage 
that is estimated for Jews in the U.S. today 62. There were violent demonstrations in Nazi 
Germany in 1942 against the Gestapo by the German wives of Jews and that slowed the 
genocide there; while creating the illusion of German democracy and responsiveness to 
pressure and demonstrations that did occur at that time. 
3.7. The “Jewish Question” in Parallel, for Israel and the Middle East: Why 
Israel Went “European” and What it Means Now:
In a parallel to the choice by Jews in the U.S., the Jewish government of Israel and 
Jews supporting it has also agreed to a similar bargain of sacrificing some positive 
political rights, progressive agenda for short-term perceived tribal interests in ways 
that both echo and reinforce the reversal of progress in the West. Both Jews in the U.S. 
and Israel have agreed to support U.S. elites in their strategies for gaining control of 
foreign resources overseas and backing away from political progress and ideals that can 
be described as central to Jewish traditions. Given similar potential dire consequences 
for Jews, it would also be in Israel’s interests to assure that there is another alternative 
before it might be too late. How that choice is seen and how Jews start to make it will 
also offer clues as to whether Jews retain any commitment to human progress in their 
culture or whether they are now like any group, protecting economic and security inter-
ests through mostly short-term calculations rather than long-term thinking.
In the U.S., Jews making this choice are a minority. The fear of repression could be 
the motivating factor in their choice. By contrast, Jews in Israel have won their inde-
pendence from a European power and include a large population of Jews who specifi-
cally fled discrimination (and death) in Europe. Given that the Jews who left Europe for 
Israel also had the same ideals of political and social progress and justice and had no 
particular reason to give these up to promote European interests, what motivated their 
choice and what does this choice mean for the possibility of progressive politics and 
social justice in the world, as a whole? Why have Jews in Israel apparently abandoned 
their politically and socially progressive agendas that were part of the original vision of 
Jewish settlers? Why are they also making a choice to support Western resource politics 
alliances? 
In many ways, the implications of changes in the world are similar for Jews in Israel 
as in the West. As in the U.S. for the past three decades (and many countries in Western 
62. From 1901 to 1905, 15% of Jews intermarried, rising to 36% by 1926-32 and 44% in 1933. Gordon, supra, p. 17.
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Europe), on a measurement scale of political progress and social justice, there has been 
a regression in Israel rather than progression. Those who have reversed this progress 
argue that it is a reality of protection and survival but do not deny that it is an aban-
donment of the agenda of progress. In the sense of Jewish traditions coming out of the 
ideals of law and the Ten Commandments, one could easily suggest that the command-
ment of love for family (honoring one’s parents and traditions) has taken precedence 
over other commandments such as killing (particularly civilians), coveting of property 
(water and lands), theft (of lands), and (though less clear) false witness. The movement 
has been towards tribalism and away from equity.
If the resource policies of the U.S. and Western Europe in the Middle East are an 
economic dead end, having caused harm not only to the Middle East but also creating 
costs for the U.S. and Western Europe that are leading to their decline, what are the 
implications and choices for Jews in Israel as the conditions worsen?
The way to understand the situation and to try to predict and then measure these 
choices into the future follows in parallel with the analysis above. One can pose the 
“Jewish Question” to analyze the choices that Jews have made and how it relates to 
maintaining the part of the culture that has supported political progress. To do that, 
requires tossing aside the current approach to looking at Jews in the Middle East that 
defines “enemies” rather than relationships and choices; clarifying that the choice for 
Jews in Israel is whether they would ally themselves with European – Western powers 
or re-establish a Middle Eastern identity; and then looking at that decision in different 
historical periods as well as consequences for the future. Overall, it appears that Jews 
returning to the Middle East have been forced into a reliance on Europe in the same way 
that most newly independent countries have also been forced into relations with former 
colonial powers and that the reality of this choice required hiding their Middle Eastern 
identity. But as Israeli Jews gain strength and as Western powers fall, the current logical 
choice that is consistent with progressive values is actually to recreate an identity that is 
Middle Eastern and that roots itself on the ideals of political and social progress that can 
be traced to early civilizations in the Middle East. Whether Jewish Israelis choose to do 
this before they add to a list of enemies will also help answer the question of whether 
Jews have assimilated into the systems of Western powers and given up the ideals of 
progress, or whether they retain them.
3.7.1. Restating the Middle Eastern Question for Jews in Terms of the “Jewish Question” 
Not in Terms of a Conflict with a Specific “Enemy”
Discourse about Israel and the Middle East is usually framed in terms of solving 
“the conflict” between “Jews and Palestinians” or “Jews and Muslims” or between “Is-
rael and the Arab world,” but this dichotomy is false for two reasons. It hides the reality 
that relationships are about choices of allies and the needs that force those choices as 
much as they are about conflicts with enemies who interfere with fulfillment of needs. 
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For one, there is an unexamined assumption that the parties to the conflict are limited 
to Jews (or Israel) and different parties in the Middle East, rather than between East 
and West (during the Cold War) or between North and South, with the region a place 
for using smaller countries to carry out these larger conflicts and where local parties 
may have been forced to take sides. Second, there is an implication that conflicts are to 
be “solved.”
More recently, the discourse has been framed in terms of a conflict between the 
Judeo-Christian world and the Muslim world. In the U.S. and in Israel, the current fram-
ing of the question asks, “What should the response of Israel and its Jewish population 
be to securing itself” in a world that presumably is filled with “Muslim extremism” and 
“terrorism” and a culture of violence and hatred for the State of Israel and for Jews?
The questions that are posed are already loaded with assumptions about the source 
of conflict and anger and how different parties see and target each other. They also 
force the presentation of history in terms of “the conflict” and of “the other” (“Jews” 
and “Arabs.”)
In fact, the “Jewish Question” is not that different from the question that all peoples 
ask in defining themselves, and self definition is not necessarily based on reinforcing 
historic conflicts. There is no fundamental historic “Jewish-Christian” conflict given 
that there is a combined “Judeo-Christian” tradition, in the same way that there is no 
such thing as a fundamental historic “Jewish-Muslim” conflict, given the joint history of 
Semitic or Middle Eastern peoples with shared traditions. There are, instead, differences 
in identity of groups relative to each other and to others. These identities are redefined 
at different times to meet particular needs and survival interests.
The “Jewish Question” (just like the “Palestinian Question” and the “Arab Ques-
tion” and “The U.S. Middle Eastern Question”) is not about how to resolve a dispute 
with a particular enemy. It is about the choice of alliance and associations in order to 
maintain the autonomy and strength of the group in relation to a set of other groups 
among whom they must choose allies and opponents in seeking out interests. The set 
of choices in context is what defines one’s identity as a group and what establishes 
whether one is closest to or farther from the “others.” This is the question that Jews had 
to answer in the history of Eastern Europe when at times they were close to Muslims 
and far from Christians and at other times were closer to Christians or different Chris-
tian sects. The basis of the choice depends on who was in power and how Jews had to 
establish themselves to protect themselves in the same place. This is the question that 
Jews had to answer in Babylonia, in Egypt, in the Roman Empire, in the Greek Empire, 
in the Ottoman Empire, in Tsarist Russia and then in revolutionary and Soviet Russia 
and elsewhere.
Why is it, then, that Israeli Jews have chosen to align with Western Europe and 
the U.S.? Given that it was Christian Europe that in recent memory nearly completed 
the extermination of Jews, that it was similar, earlier European empires such as Spain 
that led to the expulsion, diaspora and near destruction of the Jews, and that it was the 
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British who sought to continue colonial rule over Israel, what made this alignment a 
rational long-term choice, beyond simply an accommodation to short-term realities of 
power? How is it that the current “enemy” of the Jews is a set of peoples who have no 
previous history of seeking to annihilate Jews and no weapons technology of their own 
(beyond European weapons) to do real harm to Jews? Given the potential commonality 
of interests of Jews with other Middle Eastern peoples in aspirations for identity in the 
modern world, in an anti-colonial struggle, and in desire for development, why would 
Jews not make every effort to promote political progress with their neighbors rather 
than act in the interests of Western powers?
The more important sub-questions are really these. How flexible is the Israeli Jew-
ish identity as something European rather than in solidarity with Middle Eastern roots? 
Do Jews have to choose one or the other or is there a middle path? Is the current choice 
just a short-term one or a long-term irreversible one? Have past acts or commitments 
poisoned the ability to change or shift the identity?
A way to consider this overall question is to take a brief look at Jewish relations 
in the Middle East historically and then at the pressures in the last century in Jewish 
relations overall that led to this choice. Posing the question in this way helps to suggest 
that changing power relations in the world will also help change the identity question 
for Jews in a way that could reaffirm the commitment to progress.
3.7.2. Long History of Jewish Relations with Middle East: Why Don’t the Jews “Go East”?
At the heart of questions about why Jews have chosen to identify with Europe rather 
than with other Middle Eastern peoples is an assumption that Jews avoid an “Eastern” 
and harmonized Middle East because it is impossible for Jews and Arabs now to fit to-
gether, culturally. That is really a chicken and egg question. Is it impossible for them to 
now fit together culturally because they are really in conflict or because Western Euro-
pean and U.S. power have placed Jews in a situation where they are forced into conflict 
which makes it impossible for them to now fit together culturally? History helps suggest 
that the answer is more likely to be current pressures rather than history.
Despite there being differences in how Jews of “Middle Eastern” versus “European” 
cultural influence are classified and whether this kind of identification itself is just an 
artificial creation forced on Israeli Jews by international politics, the claim of Israeli 
Jews to a Middle Eastern cultural origin seems just as strong as that to a European ori-
gin. There is no logic in the backgrounds or birthplaces of Israeli Jews that would push 
them to lean more to the “West” or to the “Middle East.” While the “European” Jews 
are politically dominant and claim to be a small majority (recent figures claim that the 
“Ashkenazi” are 52%), the “Mizrahim” Middle Eastern Jews claim to be as much as 
60% of the Jewish population. This is even after large recent migrations of Jews from 
the former Soviet Union which is considered to be “European” despite the Soviet Un-
ion’s mix of Asian and Turkic influences.
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This choice of Israeli Jews to be “Western” is not necessarily rooted in Israeli or 
Zionist history, either. The first sound film made by Jews in Palestine in 1935, “Land 
of Promise”  63, depicts Israel as an “Oriental” (Eastern) country with Middle Eastern 
roots. The idea of Israeli settlers, as depicted in the film, was that they were consciously 
choosing to avoid the European materialism and Statist military and imperial conflicts, 
even though much of the current writing of Israel’s history and of Zionism suggests 
the exact opposite. Footage shows Tel Aviv after 25 years of development in a Medi-
terranean-Middle Eastern architectural style with camels serving the milling and other 
industries. Although the film disparages the life of the local Palestinian Arab popula-
tion as having fallen into a “primitive” way of life after Jews left the region, there is no 
suggestion that Middle Eastern cultures and traditions are primitive but only that the 
development of civilization that had occurred in the region had been reversed.
The idea that there was a conflict between Jewish values of material progress or 
even of development of law and ancient traditions in the region that gave birth to them 
may be a myth that is only reinforced by contemporary power relations in the world. 
Originally, Jews were a nomadic people like the Bedouins, the other non-Palestinian 
peoples whom are also relegated to second or third class citizenship in Israel, today, as 
in many other countries in the region. For most of the history, however, Jews were part 
of Middle Eastern civilizations where there was scientific advance as well as develop-
ment of concepts of political and social progress. Ancient Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, 
and the civilizations of Asia with which they (and Jews) traded were the most advanced 
of their time. It was only later that Greek and Roman civilizations followed these and 
where Jews were in conflict, and then only in recent times where Europe emerged again 
as a global leader.
After the fall of Greece and Rome, it seems that Jewish relations with the Arab world 
were closer and more productive than those with a Europe that remained backward, feu-
dal and torn by conflict for centuries. In the early 7th century, when Mohammed began 
to organize the Muslim religion, he did slaughter groups of Jewish non-followers in 
Mecca, but this is one of the rare cases of Muslim genocide against Jewish groups in the 
history of the relations. At that time, the wrath of Muslims was largely against Persia, 
Byzantium, and the Sasanians in Iran and Central Asia, and not against Jews. In this 
early period of the Muslim Empire, the Khazar Empire in north Turkey, the Caucuses 
and Eastern Europe (Ukraine, today) became a Jewish state for three hundred years; the 
first successful and only long-lived Jewish state until Israel in the past 2,000 years 64. It 
is unclear whether or not Khazaria was really an enemy of the Arab states, despite there 
being frequent wars. Current writing of the history suggests that the leaders of Khaz-
aria converted to Judaism in 740 in order to appear neutral between Christian (Slavic) 
countries, that later overran the empire, and Muslim Arabs with whom they had fought 
63. Leman, 2006. 
64. Brook, 1999.
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in wars in the early 8th century. For Khazaria, it appears that the answer to the Jewish 
question was that Judaism was acceptable to Muslims as well as to Christians. In 711, 
Jews were allies of the Muslim Moors in their attacks against Spain.
Although historians who write on Jewish-Arab relations note that Jews faced dis-
crimination in the Muslim world and faced pressures to convert to Islam, as did Chris-
tian peoples under Muslim rule, Jewish communities were always allowed to maintain 
their autonomy. A strong Jewish merchant class developed, particularly in cities like 
Cairo and in regions like Tunisia and Spain 65. There were Jewish schools throughout 
the Arab world and Jewish wealth and status grew.
The 10th through 12th centuries -- the “Islamic High Middle Ages” – are considered 
the “Golden Age” or “Hellenic Renaissance” period of Islam in which trade, philoso-
phy, and some of the sciences developed. In the area that was once Israel, Safed and 
Tiberius became centers of the Jewish religion and philosophy.
It was only when these empires began to disintegrate that Jews began to suffer, but 
it seems that the larger part of the violence was from Christians, not from Muslims, 
including the Spanish Inquisition and expulsions at the end of the 15th Century. Safed 
and Tiberius were overrun in 1573 when the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate and 
this marked the beginning of three centuries of decline of the area of Palestine for both 
the Jews and Muslims there until the emergence of continued but weak Ottoman rule. 
Although there were anti-Jewish riots in Morocco in the 19th century, there were also 
anti-Christian riots. In the invasion of Damascus in 1860, 5,000 Christians were killed 
but not Jews. Some scholars actually see anti-Jewish sentiment in the Arab world as 
driven by Christians who saw Jews as competition, rather than arising from Arabs.
Given this history, why would choose not choose to align with Middle Eastern peo-
ples in modern times? And why would Jews seek to bury or to rewrite this history in 
ways that suggest historical conflict?
3.7.3. Recent “Jewish Questions” Regarding the Jewish Fate in the Return to the Middle 
East: Why Jews were Forced into Alliances with Europe and the West and What the 
Consequences will be if Jews do Not Change this Given Changing International Power 
Relations
Most of the current histories of Israel (from Jews in the West, in Israel, and from 
Arabs) describe it as a plan by European Jews to establish a European-type Jewish 
island in the Middle East. While that may describe the current result and link it to the 
views of some of the European “Zionist” settlers who are considered symbolic leaders 
of the Jews who currently hold power, it does not fully tell the story of why the Middle 
Eastern Jews and even the majority of European Jews who came to Israel, as a reaction 
against discrimination and genocide in Europe, would have wanted to create an image 
65. Stillman, 1979.
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of the very thing they were fleeing. There is a chicken-egg problem with history. In 
fact, Jews may have been responding to political pressures from the U.S. and European 
powers that forced a different choice than Jews would actually have made in the absence 
of these pressures. 
The story that Jewish settlers in Palestine have always needed “arms” from the 
West in order to live again in the Middle East where populations were presumed to 
be “hostile” to them, or that their return to the Middle East was part of an ideology of 
Zionism that was either consciously or subconsciously racist, immediately demonizes 
the Arab world and paints Jews as aggressors in ways that promotes conflicts that may 
actually have been created by larger powers. This kind of history telling conveniently 
avoids questions about the source of the different interests then and now. The real ques-
tion about how Jews defined themselves when they came to live in Palestine is whether 
there was any kind of accommodation possible between various interests – Jews seeking 
return, Palestinians living on the land, Turks and then British making imperial claims 
to the area, and then all of the different foreign powers jockeying for access to Middle 
Eastern oil resources – and why they couldn’t reach it. 
Examining the choices that Israeli Jews and Arabs in Israel had at different times 
suggests that Jews have agreed to a political accommodation of the larger empires in 
a way that has destroyed Jewish progressive ideals. It is the depletion of oil resources 
from the region and the weakening of Western powers that could provide the opportu-
nity for a return to progressive politics and accommodation in the region.
The Israeli Jewish Question Before the 1930s: “British or Turks?”: The question 
that Jewish settlers in Israeli largely faced before the 1930s was not whether they would 
see themselves as Middle Eastern or European and how they would interact with the 
Palestinians (and Bedouins) as much as it was one between the British and the Turks. 
That also muddled the question of Israeli identity away from one of “European” or 
“Western” versus “Eastern” or “Middle Eastern.” In fact, that decision was one largely 
forced by the Turks and by the local feudal lords in Palestine. 
The standard “creation myth” of the modern State of Israel is that it was a direct 
fruition of Zionist ideology of the late 1800s, imagined by the Hungarian Jew, Theodore 
Herzl, following other nationalist and state building movements in Europe at the time 
and rejecting the idea of integration with other peoples 66. Herzl is quoted as intending in 
Israel to “form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization 
as opposed to barbarism” 67. Others similarly describe visions of Israel as a “new Swit-
zerland” with white houses and red tile roofs and pine trees, to trump its Middle Eastern 
culture 68. Despite this image, there were also competing visions of Jews returning to 
66. Herzl’s utopian vision is set out in Herzl, 1902. In the story, Jews bring European technology to Israel and find 
jobs for a “backward” Arab population out of a sense of magnanimity.
67. Herzl, 1980 [1896]: 425.
68. Lipset, 1974.
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agriculture, building socialist “kibbutzim” in working the soil, in a vision that certainly 
was not the one that city dwellers like Herzl could really have built.
Generally these depictions of Jewish settlers as choosing a “European” vision rely 
on cultural background of the Jewish settlers (“colonizers”) and also on psychology; 
suggesting the choice Jews would have made given fears of what they would need to 
protect themselves against European powers given the discrimination that Jews had 
faced in Europe for centuries. As a Hungarian Jew, Herzl would have understood the 
history of the Magyars as a nomadic people coming from the east who established their 
identity and authority in Europe in much the same way that some Slavic groups like the 
Serbs did when they also broke away from Turkic rule. They established their “church” 
and sought recognition by the European nation states around them as another State, us-
ing the church and their language as a way of securing themselves. The psychological 
explanation is that Jews were excluded on the base of their “otherness” (in Europe it 
was their “oriental” heritage) and felt that the best way to compete with their enemies, 
who were much stronger, was to emulate them. The shaving of their beards, adoption of 
Western clothes, and modeling themselves on a European pattern is little different from 
that of elites in the liberated former colonial nations throughout the globe. The phe-
nomenon of becoming one’s aggressor (a pattern found in children who are victims of 
child abuse) is a well established psychological response to a sense of disempowerment 
and to learned behaviors. In many ways, the history of the U.S., founded by religious 
minorities fleeing persecution and debtors or ex-convicts, and that of other former Brit-
ish colonies can be seen in a similar way. Many of the settlers of the Americas spoke of 
their colonies as a “new Zion” and preached co-existence with the native peoples and 
the creation of a new culture but ultimately followed the European cultural imperial 
pattern, despite some cultural borrowing and mixing with native peoples
The motivation of fear of Europe is a strong explanation of the pressures on the de-
cision of Jewish settlers from Europe, but it is not in itself enough to explain why Mid-
dle Eastern Jews would have agreed or why European Jews in Palestine weren’t able 
to transcend their history in Europe and to embrace their Middle Eastern roots. These 
European Jewish settlers were a minority even amongst the Jews in Palestine. For their 
model of a European leaning Jewish state to win, they either had to be part of a more 
powerful military alliance and/or they had to convince others to support them, which 
also implies that they relied either on force or by appeal to an argument of military al-
liances and force. Some scholars on Israeli Jewish culture describe the country as an 
Apartheid system in which the European Jews established themselves in a leadership 
role and created a second class of Middle Eastern (and Spanish/ Sephardic) Jews, the 
Mizrahim, above the Arab population. They explain this as a political reality of power 
but do not explain why the Middle Eastern Jews should have been so much less power-
ful than the European Jewish immigrants 69.
69. Khazzoom, 2003: 481-510.
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In terms of realpolitik, it is easier to understand how the Jews were pushed to take 
sides against the Turks and into an alliance with the British, despite earlier history. 
The European Jews headed to Palestine in the 19th century were heading to an area 
of the Ottoman Empire still ruled as a feudal hierarchy. It was historically antagonis-
tic to Europe and, more importantly, to the Russian Empire, to the north. While Jews 
were also antagonistic to the Russian Tsarist Empire (and Jewish revolutionaries were 
sent to Siberia and jailed or killed in the Russian Tsarist Empire) and could have been 
natural allies against Russia, they were still quite powerful in Budapest and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. After World War i, the situation reversed and a Jewish led Com-
munist government in Hungary in 1919, quickly fell, but the new Soviet government 
in Russia had Jews in leadership positions. There was no natural alliance of Jews with 
the Turks. Jewish revolutionaries who sought to overthrow State monarchies in Russia 
and Eastern Europe were a threat to the Turks and to their leaders in Palestine. Wealthy 
Jews in the Austro-Hungarian Empire promoted that empire’s goals of taking more of 
the Muslim territories in the Balkans (Bosnia) and encroaching on Turkish influence. 
In 1915-1918, the Turkish genocide against its Armenian (Christian) population – the 
first European “modern” genocide in the 20th century – would have certainly convinced 
Jews that minorities in the Ottoman Empire were subject to the horror of genocide. This 
was something they probably could not imagine happening in Europe on such a scale, 
despite massacres against Jews and others in the villages between Ukraine and Poland 
as the Soviet Empire fought for the land. 
In order to win a commitment to land in Palestine, Jews made the choice to ally 
against Turkey and with Britain in World War i, as well as to weigh the chances of im-
provements under the new government in Russia. The question is why Jews continued 
to hold to this alliance as a colonial people under the post-World War i British rule in 
Palestine. By the mid-1930s there was no longer any reason for Jews and progressives 
to have any trust in the Soviet Russian Empire, in Hungary or any of the other col-
lapsing empires of Europe. Emma Goldman was already questioning the results of the 
Russian revolution by 1923, followed by Trotsky who was exiled in 1928-29 and wrote 
about the revolution and Jews being betrayed 70
The Israeli Jewish Question after the 1930s and to the Present: “Allying with Arabs 
Against the European Colonial Powers AND/or Their Local Leaders or Allying with the 
European Colonial Powers?”: How Economic, not Military Realities, of Post-Coloni-
alism, Forced the Decision of the Jews: It seems almost contradictory and hypocritical 
that given the struggle of Israeli Jews against British colonial rule, alongside similar 
struggles by Arabs in other Middle Eastern countries, and given the fact that many Jews 
were coming to Israel to escape oppression in Europe, that Israeli Jews would have 
strengthened alliances with Western colonial powers and also slowly abandoned their 
own Middle Eastern identity and progressive agenda. The answer as to why they did is 
70. Goldman, 1923; Trotsky, 1991.
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likely the same answer as to why many other countries that fought against colonial rule 
have made the same deals with their former colonial masters in the global economy. 
Weak emerging countries often have little choice but to immediately make deals with 
the larger powers that they opposed in attempts to secure their own futures. The same 
fear that drives decisions by Jews within empires also drives decisions by minority pow-
ers in the global order. The fall of the Ottoman Empire, then the British Empire, and the 
events of World War ii led to the rise of the U.S. Empire with the U.S. gaining influence 
over areas that were under the British sphere in the Middle East. This essentially forced 
Israeli Jews to enter an alliance with the U.S. in order to deal with problems that were 
not of their creation..
In 1948, when they achieved liberation from Great Britain, Jews were still a small 
minority in the new State of Israel 71. Why would a minority seeking independence have 
created a conflict with the Arabs in Palestine who also opposed the British? Indeed, the 
British forces killed some 5,000 Arabs in suppressing colonial rebellions in 1936-39 and 
had also violently opposed a rebellion in 1916. The Arabs would have appeared to have 
been a natural ally. In terms of military alliance, however, Israeli Jews actually saw their 
chances for autonomy as greater with the British than in an alliance with Palestinian 
Arabs, given the weak history of successful nationalist Arab revolts against their own 
authoritarian rulers who would have held power after colonial independence. If Jews 
were to take sides with Palestinian Arabs, that also meant either siding with the dynas-
tic Al-Husanyi clan that had controlled Jerusalem and the Judea area for generations, 
or working in a simultaneous movement against them. The Al-Husanyi clan helped to 
polarize the conflict to ensure that Jews would not arouse Palestinian Arab masses with 
socialist ideals, even if they were rooted in the religions and history of the region. The 
heads of other Arab regions and States were quick to join with the Palestinian leaders 
in hope of stopping revolts in their own countries.
The economic reason that Israeli Jews could not appeal to most of the Arab country 
leaders and their populations in a spirit of Middle Eastern cultural fraternity after 1948 
is a simple one that is characteristic of most post-colonial States that quickly fall into 
a position of subservience under neo-colonialism. As all “developing” and newly in-
dependent peoples following colonial rule, Israeli Jews found themselves with a large 
population and few resources. This is the typical situation of Third World countries. The 
impact of colonial rule is to deplete resources and to do nothing to stabilize populations 
with those resources. Often it is to do the opposite, claiming that population growth and 
rapid consumption of resources is part of the “culture” that foreigners must “respect” 
even though it drives down wages and makes the peoples weak and vulnerably. The 
“charity” of the colonial powers is almost always in health care that continues to ratchet 
up populations even further, concentrating huge poor populations. The only immediate 
71. In 1948, census figures generally place the Jewish population of Israel at 600,000 Jews and 900,000 non-Jews, or 
40% Jewish. Today, Jews are 80% of Israelis.
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alternative is for the colonial countries to beg for the technology and aid. It is to sell 
whatever they have and to seek foreign technology as a temporary respite as part of 
the “natural” desire for “development” rather than cultural protection or stability and 
sustainability within their own resources 72. While Israel had not really been stripped of 
resources, the huge influx of Jewish settlers and refugees into a desert meant that their 
only real hope for survival was for foreign technology, foreign aid, and markets to sell 
their labor.
Israeli Jews needed imported technology, donations and trade. The only real source 
was from the West. While China, India, Mesopotamia, Turkey, and Eastern countries 
had provided the trade routes and technology in the past (and are re-emerging today) 
they weren’t able to do so in the 1940s. Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, and other cities of 
the Middle East were not going to be the places for technology or trade to meet these 
development needs at that time. Nor was the Soviet Russian Empire able to provide it 
after the devastation of the World War. While there were large populations of Jews in 
the Soviet Russian Empire and Eastern countries that nearly matched the population 
of American and Western European Jews, they did not have the accumulated wealth. 
Those countries that supported the victors of World War ii after the war were as-
sisted in rebuilding. It made sense for Israeli Jews to join the victors and there were 
ways to save face in doing so. The U.S. did not have the history of genocide against 
Jews and the English and French had been relatively accommodating. That did not 
mean that there was nothing to fear. It may have actually meant the opposite. Given the 
tremendous fear of European genocide and the demonstration of U.S. military power 
on civilian populations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the “best” choice was to ally with 
the strongest power. The U.S. and Western Europe did not get any specific economic or 
resource benefit from Israel but they did get a client state. Although the Trans-Arabian 
Pipeline was planned in 1947 to go from Saudi Arabia to Lebanon, through Israel, it 
did not come into Israeli hands until 1967 given that its route changed to go through 
the Golan Heights. In addition to technology, trade and arms, Israel also received help 
from France to build a nuclear power plant to make nuclear weapons; the protection 
they wanted not necessarily against attack from Arab countries but also against attack 
from Europe.
The result of this choice was not only a cultural one of Jews dressing in European 
clothes in the Middle East and shaving their beards as a symbol of trade with their 
Western patrons; the same choice that leaders and peoples of dependent States through-
out the rest of the world have also agreed to follow. Israeli Jews had to agree to serve 
the military interests of U.S. and Western European countries in gaining access to re-
sources. This made them an immediate target for the Soviet Russian Empire and the 
Arab countries who feared outside influence. In the 1950s, Arab governments boycotted 
72. For a short depiction of how this works in another country that is about the size of Israel, Cambodia, see Lempert, 
2007.
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Israel, the Soviet Russian Empire supplied weapons to parties opposing the U.S. in the 
region, and began to discriminate against its Jewish populations.
Within Israel, this alliance meant the strengthening of the European Jews against 
the Middle Eastern Jews because it was the Western Jews who had the greater access to 
wealth and power through relatives and through their advantage in trade and diplomacy 
with the Western powers.
Part of the agreement, similar to the one made by Jews in the U.S., was that Israeli 
Jews would also suppress their progressive movements for rights of Arabs in other cli-
ent States of the U.S. and Western powers, and would join in the opposition to Islamic 
nationalist struggles. While there is a natural affinity between these movements and the 
goals of minority protection and autonomy for Jews in the international system, Israeli 
Jews find themselves placed in a role of policing and opposing such movements and of 
being targeted by them. Even if Israeli Jews were to be at the forefront of a movement 
for establishing a progressive identity of Middle Easterners and a development again 
of scientific advance and trade that once made the region the center of civilization, it 
would have to find enough allies to stand up to the major powers and other military 
leaders whom they support against the populations of the region. That has not been true 
for most of the period since 1948, but situations have been changing.
3.8. Concluding Remarks: The Transformation of Jewish Identity: Going 
Back to the Future and to a Progressive Middle Eastern Identity: The Test of 
Whether Human “Progress” is an Illusion (An Artifact of Minority Relations) or 
a Real Possibility in Human Development
The answer to the question that began this article seems to be that political progress 
is really a reaction to the alignments of international and domestic power and that even 
minorities that establish long traditions of promoting political progress and social jus-
tice can change their identities and erode this cultural preference in order to meet their 
short-term interests and respond to their fears.
It also seems that the erosion of movements for political progress in the past three 
decades seem to be linked to the emergence of the global political reality of a dominant 
global superpower.
Several questions arise for social scientists, for political progressives, and also for 
Jews who are caught in conflicting political identifications as global political realities 
change. If the U.S., as global superpower, continues to lose its position and as new 
non-European powers arise, that should weaken pressures on progressives in the U.S. 
to distort their agendas. It should offer an opportunity to see whether the culture of pro-
gressive politics has disappeared and whether the process of assimilation passes a point 
of no return that changes progressive cultures even while they retain other symbols of 
their identity, or whether the ideals of progress have merely been suppressed out of fear.
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As countries in the East (China, Japan, Korea) develop new technologies and rival 
Europe, will they and other small countries adopt the ideals of political progress as a 
means of sharing power and of advancing humanity or is there no natural opportunity 
for these ideas to arise in those cultures? Will intermediaries, like Jews, re-emerge as 
the traders who pushed the ideals of law, science, and rights within these groups as a 
counter to movements to merely carve up the spoils of the earth through agreements by 
great powers?
As oil resources finally disappear in the Middle East and Central Asia and as a 
“Western” Israel no longer serves as a beach-head for Western military interests in 
controlling those resources, will Israel’s Jews naturally shift towards a Middle Eastern 
identity that seeks to rebuild trade relations with its neighbours in the region and more 
trade routes and cultural ties back towards the Far East? Will Israeli’s Jews reaffirm the 
cultural traditions of sovereignty of peoples, pluralism, and rights traditions and begin 
to work again towards recreating the concepts of progress that originally characterized 
the region? Or will Jewish culture as a “State” continue to reflect the model of State 
power, self interest, and opposition to progressive political and social justice ideals that 
are those of minority peoples? 73
For Jews in the U.S. and in Israel, there is a question of whether these groups will 
be able to recognize some of the long-term interests and the changing short-term trends 
and how actions that seemed to offer “protection” in the short term could be exactly 
the choice that creates their vulnerability to genocide in the U.S. and to future attack 
in the Middle East. If the collapse of the U.S. as the major super-power is sudden and 
results in significant hardship in the U.S., data suggests that Jews face severe risk of 
being forced out of the country and/or exterminated. As the U.S. Empire contracts, as oil 
resources are exhausted in the Middle East (over a time frame of some 20 to 40 years), 
and as climate change wreaks havoc on a vulnerable region that is already largely 
desert, Israel will begin to lose its trade relations, its financing from American Jews, 
and its ability to protect itself against huge and impoverished populations in the Mid-
dle East. It will be targeted as an island of remaining wealth and a symbol of colonial 
exploitation and may be unable to protect itself.
This dark vision should be enough to convince Jews to reconsider their current alli-
ances and to begin to think in terms of a more global and more Middle Eastern identity. 
But even if it does, will that identity simply be one of power and protection or will it 
also include a vision of political and social progress? Will it reinspire a vision of the 
Middle East as a mix of peoples whose cultures all have value simply because of their 
difference, and as a place that defines its values as progress in law, philosophy, and 
73. In Yuri Slezkine’s underlying formulation of this social question regarding Jews and other landless peoples, those 
peoples who are service oriented and landless are those who take up the banner of political progress as part of their 
culture while those who are landed become conservative. With Jewish populations split between Israelis with a state 
and minorities elsewhere, there is some chance to test this hypothesis. For now, the answer is that Jews in both places 
are acting with U.S. and Western elites for reasons of fearing their power rather than out of any cultural difference.
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technology as it was in Babylonian, Egyptian, and the high point of the Muslim Middle 
Ages? Will Jews act to spark new self-concepts in the newly emerging powers of Asia 
that have also lost links with their earlier traditions of progress or will they continue to 
abandon them and read different meaning into history? 
Watching how events follow these predictions will help tell us whether we are a 
species that progresses or one that is locked into laws of social behavior that merely 
changes the actors in a series of processes. Reaction to observations in contributions 
like these will also offer an insight into how those choices are made and how deeply 
ideas about progress and future interests are part of human decision-making, if at all.
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